Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Global Analysis, 1987–2007

Abstract

Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflicts but not in others? This study argues that child soldiers can be viewed as a military innovation that governments and rebel groups have differing costs and incentives in employing. It is hypothesized that longer, bloodier conflicts, disputant capacities, and the presence of democratic institutions significantly influence whether child soldiers are used by one or both parties during internal armed conflicts. The effects of these factors are statistically analyzed, uncovering new insights into global patterns of child soldier usage by governments and rebel groups.

Refugees and Recruitment: Understanding Violations Against Children in Armed Conflict With Novel Data

“…In order to foster an understanding of the full scope of child recruitment dynamics into armed forces, this article contributes a theoretical evaluation of the supply-side dynamics of child recruitment into armed conflict by examining the role of displacement in rendering children particularly vulnerable to recruitment practices and grave violations in armed conflict. Ultimately, this effort builds upon recent scholarship that advances quantitative and cross-national studies of child soldiering (Haer, 2019; Lasley & Thyne, 2015; Tynes & Early, 2015), with particular reference to the seminal analysis of child soldiers within this literature (Achvarina & Reich, 2006). The analysis herein expands upon that of Achvarina and Reich in three ways: Firstly, their assessment focuses on child recruitment within the continent of Africa, but the authors offer no convincing arguments for why this assessment holds explanatory power in other regions.…”

Rebel funding and child soldiers: Exploring the relationship between natural resources and forcible recruitment

“…Consistent with our expectations, the longer an armed group is active and the more intense the conflict in terms of battle-related deaths, the more likely the rebel group is to forcibly recruit children. Additionally, the forced recruitment of children by governments is associated with significantly more forced child recruitment by rebels, mirroring the results of Tynes and Early (2015). Model 1 also shows that rebel groups with a strong central command structure are more likely to forcibly recruit children.…”

“…We include several controls that have been shown to influence the (forcible) recruitment of children or a rebel group’s endowments (e.g. Beber and Blattman, 2013; Jo, 2015; Tynes and Early, 2015). These controls are especially vital for the empirical models given the risk of selection on observables.…”

“…Seventh, rebels’ decision to coercively recruit children might be influenced by the actions of the government against which it is fighting, and particularly whether government forces also engage in the forced recruitment of children (Tynes and Early, 2015). To control for the effect of the Forcible recruitment of children by the government , we coded whether a government (i.e.…”

“…For the analyses, we have transformed it to a 0 to 20 scale. 20 We also include Gleditsch’s (2002) measure of the natural logarithm of a state’s gross domestic product per capita ( GDP per capita ) to account for the fact that children might be more likely to join armed groups in poorer countries (Tynes, 2011; Tynes and Early, 2015). Additionally, we incorporate a measure to account for the general supply of children within a country.…”