Governors matter

Abstract

This study uses the latest 2011 round of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for the Russian Federation to take a closer look at regional‐level factors influencing the business environment in Russia. Specifically, the study explores the role of regional administrations and variables of administrative continuity and governor origin in shaping regional business environment. The findings reveal that regional businesses in Russia are (1) acutely anxious about administrative transitions (as expressed in gubernatorial replacements) and favour administrative continuity, and (2) favour government officials that are locally embedded. The analysis suggests that many localities in Russia have witnessed the emergence of mutually beneficial state‐business arrangements that are inimical to economic competition.

What Agglomeration Externalities Impact the Development of the Hi-tech Industry Sector? Evidence from the Russian Regions

“…First, this industry sector is essentially underfunded in Russian regions due to the current challenging economic situation in the country (Serebryakova et al, 2018;Lyapina et al, 2019). Secondly, although the government strives to stimulate the formation of clusters in Russia, companies struggle to cooperate and establish business networks, due to various institutional factors, such as cultural peculiarities (Sosnovskikh, 2017), business uncertainty (Grigoriev and Dekalchuk, 2017), and relationships with the government itself (Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks, 2017). Third, our tests revealed an absence of lag between investments (input) and results (density of the used high-technologies).…”

The effects of culture, attitudes and perceptions on industrial cluster policy: The case of Russia

“…Regional authorities need to mobilise all their networks with influence in federal institutions, whereas in their own region they must organise a strong team of state managers capable of generating ideas and projects and deliver solid results when the initiatives are implemented (Sharafutdinova & Steinbuks, 2017).…”

“…In Russia, many of these companies count on the goodwill of the regional authorities for gaining licences, construction permissions and avoidance of bureaucratic procedures related to doing business. Others may rely on political networks to gain access to state-funded contracts and projects (Demidova & Yakovlev, 2012;Sharafutdinova & Steinbuks, 2017). And there is refuge in numbers; Feldman et al (2005) suggest that co-locating firms reduces uncertainty as it increases the awareness of emerging trends: innovation clusters spatially in locations where knowledge externalities lower the costs of discovery and commercialization.…”

Electoral Loyalty and Quality of Service Delivery in Russian Municipalities

“…Укорененность местных глав в локальную жизнь делает их в большей степени подотчетными и видимыми (Tsai, 2007, Persson andZhuravskaya, 2016). Однако, некоторые типы укорененности (bonding capital) имеют «темную сторону» и могут усиливать кооперацию между главами и местными бизнесэлитами в партикуляристских целях (Mattingly, 2016, Libman, Kozlov, Schultz, 2012, Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks, 2017. Поэтому коалиции местных предпринимателей и администраций могут предотвратить захват институтов государством, однако не спасают от предвзятого и неэффективного распределения ресурсов (Libman, Kozlov, Schultz, 2012).…”

“…Taylor, 2011, Gel'man, 2016. Исследования субнационального уровня ориентированы на электоральную и партийную политику, а также отношения между элитами и бизнесом Robertson, 2012, Sharafutdinova andSteinbuks, 2017). Ряд исследователей утверждают, что феномен политически обусловленных трансфертов и иных выплат наблюдался на федеральных выборах в 1990-е гг.…”