2019
DOI: 10.1007/s10610-019-09416-4
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Grand corruption and government change: an analysis of partisan favoritism in public procurement

Abstract: Incoming governments sometimes abuse their power to manipulate the allocation of government contracts so as to buy loyalty from cronies. While scandals suggest such practices are relatively widespread, the extent of such partisan favoritism is difficult to measure and the conditions under which it flourishes under-theorized. Drawing on theory regarding the role of institutions as constraints on corruption, we identify three spheres of political influence over government contracting and show how elites can mani… Show more

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Cited by 62 publications
(39 citation statements)
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“…Through the EITI localization in Nigeria, the transparency process in the Nigerian extractive industry is “captured” (Dávid‐Barrett & Fazekas, 2019) by the “ogas” and transparency takes on a new meaning. It has come to mean the disclosure of information at the will of the “chief oga.” And so the EITI, rather than cleaning up the Nigerian “penkelemes” starts to adapt to and become part of the “penkelemes.” Indeed, corruption begins to take hold and shape the nature and content of transparency.…”
Section: Methods and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Through the EITI localization in Nigeria, the transparency process in the Nigerian extractive industry is “captured” (Dávid‐Barrett & Fazekas, 2019) by the “ogas” and transparency takes on a new meaning. It has come to mean the disclosure of information at the will of the “chief oga.” And so the EITI, rather than cleaning up the Nigerian “penkelemes” starts to adapt to and become part of the “penkelemes.” Indeed, corruption begins to take hold and shape the nature and content of transparency.…”
Section: Methods and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, these rents reduced the higher targets of allocative efficiency and vice versa, which was blamed for favoritism. Dávid- Barrett and Fazekas (2020) argued that corruption worked with favoritism in public contracting and government agencies played their role in the process of favoritism. On the other hand, the quality of institutions would play their role in a transparent procurement system.…”
Section: International Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Окремі У цьому напрямі також плідно працювали й зарубіжні колеги (in particular, Dávid-Barrett, & Fazekas, 2020;.…”
Section: вступunclassified