The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade~GATT! and the World Trade Organization~WTO! have been touted as premier examples of international institutions, but few studies have offered empirical proof+ This article comprehensively evaluates the effects of the GATT0WTO and other trade agreements since World War II+ Our analysis is organized around two factors: institutional standing and institutional embeddedness+ We show that many countries had rights and obligations, or institutional standing, in the GATT0WTO even though they were not formal members of the agreement+ We also expand the analysis to include a range of other commercial agreements that were embedded with the GATT0WTO+ Using data on dyadic trade since 1946, we demonstrate that the GATT0WTO substantially increased trade for countries with institutional standing, and that other embedded agreements had similarly positive effects+ Moreover, our evidence suggests that international trade agreements have complemented, rather than undercut, each other+ When and how do international institutions promote cooperation? Few questions are as fundamental to international relations or as salient for world leaders+ Due to the contributions of Keohane and others, we now have sophisticated theories about the emergence and effects of international institutions, but empirical research has not proceeded apace+ 1 As Frieden and Martin point out, "theoretical work on interAn earlier version of this article was presented at the