Greater Russia: Is Moscow out to subvert the West?

Abstract

Russia today is presented as out to subvert the West. The chosen means are meddling in elections and sowing discord in Western societies. Russia in this imaginary looms over an unsuspecting West, undermining democracy and supporting disruptive forces. No longer couched in terms of the Cold War struggle between capitalism and communism, this is a reversion to great power politics of the rawest sort. However, is this analysis correct? Is Vladimir Putin out to undermine the West to achieve his alleged goal of re-establishing some sort of post-Soviet 'greater Russia' imperial union in Russia's neighbourhood, to weaken the Atlantic power system and to undermine the liberal international order? The paper challenges the view that Russia is trying to reconstitute a Soviet-type challenge to the West, and provides an analytical framework to examine the dynamics of Russian foreign policy and on that basis assesses Russia's real rather than imaginary aspirations.

Sad delusions: The decline and rise of Greater Europe

“…Russia has returned as an international conservative power, but it is not a revisionist one, and even less is it out to subvert the West (Sakwa, 2020). Russia certainly looks for allies where it can find them, especially if they advocate the lifting of sanctions.…”

La política exterior rusa pos Guerra Fría. ¿Caso paradigmático de revisionismo?

“…Pese a que, con anterioridad a la crisis ucraniana, Rusia y China ya habían logrado profundizar sus vínculos en diversos terrenos, a partir de 2014, Moscú aceleraría esta política de «Pivote hacia el Este» (Sakwa, 2020b) 33 . En este marco, se produciría una armonización de sus posturas en el escenario multilateral, un incremento de la cooperación militar y en materia de seguridad, así como una intensificación de los lazos económicos y energéticos.…”

“…Como tal, el fenómeno precede a la narrativa sobre el peligro rojo, sumamente poderosa durante la era soviética. Además, concierne a una representación sobre el país entero y no solo respecto a sus élites, tal como lo ilustra la siguiente afirmación del ex director de Inteligencia Nacional, John Clapper, en 2017: «Russians are almost genetically driven to coopt, penetrate, gain favor, whatever, which is a typical Russian technique» (citado enSakwa, 2020b). Por lo tanto, la Russia Anxiety no solo se deriva de lo queNeumann (2007) describe como la «falta de poder social» del Estado ruso a partir del siglo XIX, en referencia a su trayectoria de regímenes despóticos y la relativa ineficacia de su administración pública en comparación con Europa occidental; sino que se trata de un proceso de carácter más histórico y esencialmente irracional.…”

Fellow travelers or Trojan horses? Similarities across pro-Russian parties’ electorates in Europe

“…Existing literature on Russia’s foreign policy distinguishes between several perspectives on causes and goals of Russia’s foreign policy in Europe (Bentzen, 2018; Forsberg and Haukkala, 2016; Foxall, 2019; Galeotti, 2019; Götz, 2016; Karlsen, 2019; Kragh and Åsberg, 2017; Sakwa, 2020). Regardless of their views on the central drivers or reasons for the current status quo, all schools of thought ultimately tend to perceive the current state of EU-Russia relations as confrontational, and Russia’s foreign policy as based on a strident opposition to the West (Trenin, 2016; Snegovaya, 2020), which makes the Kremlin “not afraid of taking risks if such is the requirement for enforcing its definition of core geopolitical interests” (Tsygankov, 2018: 109).…”

“…Regardless of their views on the central drivers or reasons for the current status quo, all schools of thought ultimately tend to perceive the current state of EU-Russia relations as confrontational, and Russia’s foreign policy as based on a strident opposition to the West (Trenin, 2016; Snegovaya, 2020), which makes the Kremlin “not afraid of taking risks if such is the requirement for enforcing its definition of core geopolitical interests” (Tsygankov, 2018: 109). In doing so, the Kremlin looks for partners in Europe that could help achieve its goals in the region (Sakwa, 2020).…”