Greek Communism, 1968–2001

Kalyvas, Stathus N.; Marantzidis, Nikos

doi:10.1177/088832502766275867

Cited by 9 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Measuring Greek party attitudes to issues including ‘nationalism, immigration, ethical issues, and civil liberties’, Gemenis and Dinas (2010: 189) find similar evidence of polarisation between Greek parties and the emergence of a new cleavage ‘over the nature and character of value priorities’. The radical left‐wing KKE links its nationalism to civic ideals including anti‐Westernism and anti‐imperialism (Kalyvas & Marantzidis 2002). The latter was heightened by the party's view of the Cyprus issue in 1974 as a ‘proof that the country had been wronged by the United States and NATO’ (Kalyvas & Marantzidis 2002: 678–679).…”

Section: The Nationalist Determinants Of Euroscepticism In Greece Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The radical left‐wing KKE links its nationalism to civic ideals including anti‐Westernism and anti‐imperialism (Kalyvas & Marantzidis 2002). The latter was heightened by the party's view of the Cyprus issue in 1974 as a ‘proof that the country had been wronged by the United States and NATO’ (Kalyvas & Marantzidis 2002: 678–679). The nationalism of radical right‐wing LAOS is predominantly associated with ethnic values (Georgiadou 2008; Sotiropoulos 2010).…”

Section: The Nationalist Determinants Of Euroscepticism In Greece Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism

Halikiopoulou¹,

Nanou²,

Vasilopoulou³

2012

European J Political Res

263

153

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What can explain the strong euroscepticism of radical parties of both the right and the left? This article argues that the answer lies in the paradoxical role of nationalism as a central element in both party families, motivating opposition towards European integration. Conventionally, the link between nationalism and euroscepticism is understood solely as a prerogative of radical right‐wing parties, whereas radical left‐wing euroscepticism is associated with opposition to the neoliberal character of the European Union. This article contests this view. It argues that nationalism cuts across party lines and constitutes the common denominator of both radical right‐wing and radical left‐wing euroscepticism. It adopts a mixed‐methods approach, combining intensive case study analysis with quantitative analysis of party manifestos. First, it traces the link between nationalism and euroscepticism in Greece and France in order to demonstrate the internal validity of the argument. It then undertakes a cross‐country statistical estimation to assess the external validity of the argument and its generalisability across Europe.

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Section: The Nationalist Determinants Of Euroscepticism In Greece Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Nationalist Determinants Of Euroscepticism In Greece Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism

Halikiopoulou¹,

Nanou²,

Vasilopoulou³

2012

European J Political Res

263

153

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“…For Greek Communists, the EU is a reactionary institution in the service of big business, anti-democratic and anti-national. Consequently, not only the KKE has opposed all reform of EU Treaties, but also considers that there is no possible remedy for the EU given its "class nature", advocating then the exit of Greece from the same 64 .…”

Section: Specific Parties Of the Radical Leftmentioning

confidence: 99%

Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism

Prat¹

2013

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Euroscepticism has become a generic catch-all term that is not always useful in capturing the nuances of the different types of political opposition to the current process of European integration. This book analyses in detail the electoral manifestos and programmes presented by twenty-two parties during the European Parliamentary elections in 2009. The research indicates that radical right-wing parties usually have Europhobic impulses-their rejection being not only of methods, but also of principles. In contrast, radical left-wing parties are, in theory, favourable to European integration, but dispute the direction currently imposed by the EU authorities. Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat is Professor of Political Science at the University of Barcelona. He is a Doctor of Law and holds a degree in Contemporary History. His principal research interests are in comparative politics and, more specifically, European comparative politics. Within this field, his main focus is political parties. He has published numerous books and articles on these subjects and has worked as a visiting researcher in research centres and universities in Rome,

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“…As in past electoral contests, its strategy employed two resources: a far-left ideology replete with nationalistic undertones, and vociferous social protest against the dominant parties, world imperialism and the market (Kalyvas & Marantzidis 2002). This way, the KKE sought to safeguard its electoral niche against both PASOK and SYRIZA, its post-materialist rival within the broader left (of which more below).…”

Section: Campaign Parties and Post-electoral Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 95%

Winning by Default: The Greek Election of 2009

Pappas¹

2010

South European Society and Politics

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Greek Communism, 1968–2001

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism

The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism

Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism

Winning by Default: The Greek Election of 2009

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