Green channel coordination under asymmetric information

Ranjbar, Amirhossein; Heydari, Jafar; Hosseini, Mahsa Madani; Yahyavi, Davood

doi:10.1007/s10479-021-04284-w

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…In contrast, this paper explores both product pricing and green effort input from two players within a dynamic framework. Ranjbar et al [29] in a two-level supply chain examined product prices and green efforts put in by a manufacturer and retailer, and designed incentive contracts that incorporate the manufacturer's green efforts and the wholesale price under green information asymmetry. Cao et al [6] focused on a green agri-food supply chain in which a cooperative invested in green planting effort while a retail enterprise exerted green processing effort.…”

Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Swami and Shah [32], Ranjbar et al [29] have shown in their studies that there is a significant correlation between product pricing and parameters associated with green activities, such as the marginal contribution of green behavior and the coefficient of green investment cost. However, this study reaches a different conclusion, suggesting that these parameters including green effort efficiency are not related to product pricing.…”

Section: Decentralized Scenario (Model D)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Product pricing, green effort decisions and coordination in a dynamic three-echelon green supply chain

Wang,

Liu,

Wen

2024

JIMO

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The paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a green supplier, a green manufacturer and a retailer. Considering the dynamic changes in product greenness, differential games are employed to investigate product prices, green efforts and coordination in the system. By comparing equilibrium results in various scenarios, it is found that supply chain decisionmakers invest more in green efforts to maximize their profits under centralized decision, while they select pricing tools under decentralized decision. Importantly, when a local alliance composed of the supplier and manufacturer supplies products to the retailer at a flexible and dynamic wholesale price, the two-part tariff contract can fully coordinate the three-echelon green supply chain. The Rubinstein bargaining model is then used to optimize the profit allocation within the alliance. Additionally, the impact of green effort efficiency on decision-making is explored, revealing that green efforts depend on the efficiency of green efforts, while product pricing has nothing to do with the efficiency of efforts. The paper also points out that decentralization increases the probability of the supplier engaging in more green efforts than the manufacturer.

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Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Decentralized Scenario (Model D)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Product pricing, green effort decisions and coordination in a dynamic three-echelon green supply chain

Wang,

Liu,

Wen

2024

JIMO

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“…A large body of research has examined various service provision modes from the perspective of the identity of the service provider, such as retailer-provided service (Ranjbar et al, 2021;Tsay & Agrawal, 2000), manufacturer-provided service (Guan et al, 2020), third-partyprovided service (Kouvelis & Shi, 2020), platform-provided service (Zhang et al, 2021), and a co-operative service mode (Liu et al, 2014;Zhang et al, 2020a). Furthermore, several papers have compared the above service modes to explore which party should perform the demand-enhancing service.…”

Section: Service Provisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Retailer service strategy on livestreaming platforms considering free riding behavior

Xie

Shi

2023

Ann Oper Res

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Livestreaming e-commerce is a significant and effective digital tool for retailers to boost sales during the COVID-19 outbreak. Services on livestreaming platforms may be provided by either the manufacturer or the retailer. As service free riding across products becomes increasingly prevalent, the key issues retailers face include selecting which product should be promoted and who should provide service on the livestreaming channel. Using a gametheoretic framework, we investigate a retailer's optimal livestreaming service strategy that considers free riding between the retailer's store brand and a manufacturer's national brand. Our main findings are as follows. When service resources on the livestreaming channel are limited, (1) the retailer should not promote products with extremely low base demand, and (2) given that the national brand is promoted, if the two brands exhibit either very similar or significantly different features, the retailer should provide service for the national brand personally; otherwise, the retailer should delegate the service to the manufacturer. When livestreaming resources are unlimited, it may be unnecessary for the retailer to promote both brands if the store brand has a large base demand.

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Sustainable supply chain coordination: extant literature, trends, and future research directions

Sabbaghnia,

Heydari,

Ülkü

et al. 2024

Ann Oper Res

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Green channel coordination under asymmetric information

Cited by 5 publications

References 58 publications

Product pricing, green effort decisions and coordination in a dynamic three-echelon green supply chain

Product pricing, green effort decisions and coordination in a dynamic three-echelon green supply chain

Retailer service strategy on livestreaming platforms considering free riding behavior

Sustainable supply chain coordination: extant literature, trends, and future research directions

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