2021
DOI: 10.3390/math9243154
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Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence

Abstract: This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain (GSC) with a single loss-averse manufacturer and a single loss-averse retailer. Since the Nash bargaining solution exactly characterizes endogenous power and the contribution of the GSC members, it is introduced as the loss-averse reference point for the GSC members. Based on this, a decision model of the two-echelon GSC with loss aversion is formulated. The optimal strategies of price and product green degree are derived in four scenarios: (a) the centr… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…On the green supply chain coordination mechanism, unlike traditional supply chains, green supply chains focus on improving the greenness level of products and adopt various coordination contracts such as cost-sharing contracts, two-part price contracts, and benefit-sharing contracts to compensate manufacturers for their investment in the greenness level of products (Ghosh and Shah, 2015;Panja and Mondal, 2019;Yi et al, 2021), to coordinate the supply chain system and thus improve the profits of supply chain members. In a green supply chain coordination problem, Ghosh and Shah (2015) compare the effects of the cost-sharing contract and the retailer-manufacturer bargain on the costsharing contract on product greenness, green product price, and supply chain member profitability.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the green supply chain coordination mechanism, unlike traditional supply chains, green supply chains focus on improving the greenness level of products and adopt various coordination contracts such as cost-sharing contracts, two-part price contracts, and benefit-sharing contracts to compensate manufacturers for their investment in the greenness level of products (Ghosh and Shah, 2015;Panja and Mondal, 2019;Yi et al, 2021), to coordinate the supply chain system and thus improve the profits of supply chain members. In a green supply chain coordination problem, Ghosh and Shah (2015) compare the effects of the cost-sharing contract and the retailer-manufacturer bargain on the costsharing contract on product greenness, green product price, and supply chain member profitability.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%