2021
DOI: 10.1080/00207659.2021.1930882
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Grievances and political action in Russia during Putin’s rise to power

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
1
0

Year Published

2023
2023
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
2

Relationship

0
2

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
references
References 52 publications
0
1
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Hence, we might expect that protesters and non-protesters consumed different media. Lastly, whilst these may not be the articulated protest grievances or claims per se, social science research on mass protest – but also on mass protest in competitive authoritarian and democratizing contexts – has repeatedly found that protesters also distinguish themselves from non-protesters in their preference or support for other at least initially seemingly unrelated (or not immediately seen as connected to the protest triggers) political dispositions and policy aims that do in fact, align with the democratic values and dispositions (de Almeida, Sá, and Faria 2022; Ash 2022; Li 2021; Onuch 2014b; Onuch and Sasse 2016b, 2022a, 2022b; Schumaker 1975; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2014). Thus, taking on board these empirically tested theories – confirmed not only in (competitive) authoritarian and democratizing contexts internationally but also specifically in cases like Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan – we have some clear expectations about the potential portrait of the median protester in Belarus’ mass mobilization in 2020.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, we might expect that protesters and non-protesters consumed different media. Lastly, whilst these may not be the articulated protest grievances or claims per se, social science research on mass protest – but also on mass protest in competitive authoritarian and democratizing contexts – has repeatedly found that protesters also distinguish themselves from non-protesters in their preference or support for other at least initially seemingly unrelated (or not immediately seen as connected to the protest triggers) political dispositions and policy aims that do in fact, align with the democratic values and dispositions (de Almeida, Sá, and Faria 2022; Ash 2022; Li 2021; Onuch 2014b; Onuch and Sasse 2016b, 2022a, 2022b; Schumaker 1975; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2014). Thus, taking on board these empirically tested theories – confirmed not only in (competitive) authoritarian and democratizing contexts internationally but also specifically in cases like Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan – we have some clear expectations about the potential portrait of the median protester in Belarus’ mass mobilization in 2020.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%