Grime and Punishment: Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation

Lehmann, Hartmut; Wadsworth, Jonathan; Acquisti, Alessandro

doi:10.1006/jcec.1999.1616

Cited by 119 publications

(114 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…These included wage arrears, forced leaves, reduction in hours of work and in-kind payments (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti 1999;Earle and Sabirianova 2002;Haltiwanger, Lehmann and Terrell 2003).…”

Section: Transition and Household Welfare: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Poverty During Transition: Household Survey Evidence from Ukraine

et al. 2008

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe paper analyzes the incidence, the severity and the determinants of household poverty in Ukraine during transition using two comparable surveys from 1996 and 2004. We measure poverty using income and consumption and contrast the effects of various poverty lines.Poverty in both periods follows some of the determinants commonly identified in the literature, including greater poverty among households with children and with less education.We also identify specific features of poverty in transition, including the relatively low importance of unemployment and the existence of poverty even among households with employment. Poverty determinants change over time in line with the experience of transition and restructuring.

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Section: Transition and Household Welfare: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Poverty During Transition: Household Survey Evidence from Ukraine

et al. 2008

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“…some Schumpeterian "creative destruction" (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999) translated in the relatively large growth rates, but on the other hand, it resulted in the build-up of very stagnant unemployment pool due to low outflow rates from unemployment. In the CIS, on the contrary, the costs of labor are much lower because nonemployment benefits are very low, and various specific adjustment mechanisms such as wage arrears, unpaid leave, reduced working week and payment in-kind are extensively used (as documented by Lehmann et al, 1999, andSabirianova, 2000). These low labor costs imply that labor hoarding is still existent in many enterprises, especially in the state sector, and that the reservation wage is also very low.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of unemployment duration in Ukraine

Kupets

2006

Journal of Comparative Economics

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This paper presents first evidence on the determinants of unemployment duration in Ukraine between 1997 and 2003, using individual-level data from the first wave of the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS -2003). It investigates the conditional probability of an individual leaving unemployment to employment or economic inactivity in any particular month of his spell out of work by estimating it in a discrete time independent competing risks framework with flexible baseline hazard rates and gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity. The results in all specifications indicate no significant effect of receiving unemployment benefits but significant negative effect of having income from casual activities, subsidiary farming, household income or pension on the hazard of reemployment. Multivariate analysis also suggests that policies to reduce long-term unemployment should focus on older workers, less educated individuals, residents of small towns and rural area in the regions with relatively high unemployment rates. Olga Kupets NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARYThe persistent and stagnant character of unemployment over the last decade in Ukraine has become an overwhelming concern for policymakers and for society in general. The problems of unemployment are aggravated even more because the incidence of long-term unemployment and the average duration of unemployment appear to have decreased slowly in response to increases in labor demand in previous years. This implies that there are potentially serious barriers existing between long-term unemployed and new job opportunities. Consequently, one possible way to tackle the problem of long-term unemployment in Ukraine is to combat the inflow into long-term unemployment by offering more assistance to job losers before they reach the stage of long-term unemployment (i.e. preventive measures). A second important way is to apply measures focused on the needs of the more disadvantaged groups which aim at reducing the existing stock of chronic unemployed. In this context, it is of vital importance to understand the forces which tend to shape the structure of unemployment duration and its dynamics in order to properly design the social and economic policy model. The main purpose of this study is to determine factors which affect the probability of reemployment or withdrawing from the labor force after a period of unemployment in Ukraine over the last years. In particular we look at the impact of unemployment benefits and alternative sources of income during an unemployment spell, various individual and local labor market characteristics.The theoretical framework of our empirical study is job search approach. This paper builds on previous works in developed countries by estimating the conditional probability of leaving unemployment in a discrete time independent competing risks framework with flexible baseline hazard rates and gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity. The data base is a sample of unemployment spells experienced by individuals over the period

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“…To measure the contractual wage, we added questions to the RLMS in 1998 and 2000, and for the earlier years we have followed Earle and Sabirianova (2002), imputing it as the ratio of the total wage debt to the number of monthly wages owed (ω). 16 See Lehmann, et al (1999), Desai and Idson (2000), and Earle and Sabirianova (2002) for descriptions of the empirical patterns. We do not report them here, but they also hold in our data.…”

Section: Sample Characteristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous studies of Russian wage delays have established some of the empirical regularities that motivate our analysis (e.g., Gimpelson, 1998;Lehmann et al, 1999;Desai and Idson, 2000). We depart from this literature in our analytical approach, our use of linked employer-employee data (rather than just individual information from household surveys), and our interpretation of arrears as a breach of contract rather than a flexible wage adjustment (as in 6 See North (1990) and Hadfield (2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation

Earle¹,

Peter²

2006

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We analyze a model of wage delay in which strategic complementarity arises because each employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The model is estimated on panel data for workers and firms in Russia, facilitating identification through fixed effects for employees, employers, and local labor markets, and instrumental variables based on policy interventions. The estimated reaction function displays strongly positive neighborhood effects, and the estimated feedback loops -worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties -imply that costs of wage delays are attenuated by neighborhood arrears. We also study a nonlinear case with two stable equilibria: a punctual payment and a late payment equilibrium. The estimates imply that the theoretical conditions for multiple equilibria under symmetric labor market competition are satisfied in our data.JEL Classifications: A12, B52, J30, K42, L14, O17, P31, P37

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Grime and Punishment: Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation

Cited by 119 publications

References 8 publications

Determinants of Poverty During Transition: Household Survey Evidence from Ukraine

Determinants of Poverty During Transition: Household Survey Evidence from Ukraine

Determinants of unemployment duration in Ukraine

Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation

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