2020
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1752746
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Grounding and the Myth of Ontological Innocence

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…More generally, I think you should regard as false any completely unmotivated philosophical thesis whose truth implies the existence of infinitely many fundamental facts (see Barker 2021). That is, I endorse the following principle:…”
Section: Grounding Ungroundedmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…More generally, I think you should regard as false any completely unmotivated philosophical thesis whose truth implies the existence of infinitely many fundamental facts (see Barker 2021). That is, I endorse the following principle:…”
Section: Grounding Ungroundedmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…20 Here is another principle that Fix should be contrasted with. Where 'F' and 'G' are predicates that correspond to qualitative properties (the latter corresponding to the conjunction of all of y's qualitive properties), Barker (2021) has put forward the following thesis:…”
Section: B Similar Principlesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…55–56). Because Barker (2021) gives an argument that it is not possible to have two entities that are both fully grounded by a single entity, however, we will also consider cases that do not appeal to a common ground as well.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%