Grounding in the image of causation

Schaffer, Jonathan

doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1

Cited by 345 publications

(264 citation statements)

References 79 publications

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“…First, Cartesian-type interactionist accounts of the relationship between mind and body (assuming that they are coherent) postulate causal relata that are not only metaphysically independent of each other but also equally fundamental. Second, causality is typically taken to be a relationship between distinct events, whereas metaphysical dependence holds arguably between indistinct events (or existents) (Rosen 2010;Schaffer 2016). Third, even though effects might in some sense arise out of (or be produced by) their causes (Hall 2004, p. 225), typical causal relationships do not establish metaphysical priority.…”

Section: Fixingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

Elpidorou

2017

Topoi

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naturalism, and dualism are reconsidered. The special issue is neither the first nor the last word on the topic of the character physicalism. Nonetheless, it offers both an updated appraisal of our current understanding of physicalism and concrete proposals for how to move forward. Physicalism: Ontology and MetaphysicsAt the heart of physicalism lies an ontological (or if you prefer, ontic) thesis.1 To espouse physicalism is to make certain commitments about what types of things (objects, properties, events, states of affairs) exist in our world (Quine 1948; cf. Hellman and Thompson 1977, p. 310).2 IfNot many issues in philosophy can be said to match, let alone rival, physicalism's importance, persistent influence, and divisiveness. To a first approximation, physicalism holds that everything that exists in our world is physical. An acceptance of physicalism commits thus one to a monistic worldview. Despite how variegated existing entities or properties might appear to be, everything that exists in our world is, according to physicalism, the same: namely, physical. Indeed, it is widely thought that physicalism demands not only that the non-physical (the chemical, the biological, the economic, the social, the mental, etc.) metaphysically depends on the physical but also that the non-physical is nothing over and above the physical. But what type of metaphysical dependence vindicates physicalism?The aim of this editorial introduction is twofold. First, Sects. 1-8 offer a critical introduction to the metaphysical character of physicalism. In those sections, I present and evaluate different ways in which proponents of physicalism have made explicit the metaphysical dependence that is said to hold between the non-physical and the physical. Some of these accounts are found to be problematic; others are shown to be somewhat more promising. In the end, some important lessons are drawn and different options for physicalists are presented. Second, in Sect. 9, the six papers that comprise the special issue are introduced and summarized. Each contribution to the special is, in different ways, concerned with explicating the character of physicalism. New ways of formulating physicalism are assessed; old ways are defended; and the distinctions between physicalism, Both terms are acceptable and the choice between them is ultimately idiosyncratic. "Physicalism" has the benefit of rendering the metaphysical view under discussion both more general (the extension of "physical," I presume, is larger than that of "material") and closer to present-day physics. "Materialism" has the benefit of showing how the metaphysical view under discussion has a historical lineage and as such relates to the views of Hobbes, Lucretius, and Democritus. 2 It is often stated that physicalism is both a contingent thesis and one that has strong modal commitments (Lewis 1983;Jackson 1998; Stoljar 2015). Its contingency is manifested in the claim that physicalism is a thesis about our world and even if it is true, it did not have to be so. Furthermore, the ...

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Section: Fixingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

Elpidorou

2017

Topoi

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“…Further, since Grounding has been taken by some to be akin to metaphysical causation, this gives us further reason to think that it might be useful in explicating the causal priority within the Trinity. 70 the Father there must be the Son. A similar story could be told regarding the Holy Spirit, where either the Father alone, or the Father and Son ground the Holy Spirit.…”

Section: Brian Leftow Writes Perhaps Deity Is Not a Property Aquinamentioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘Power’-ful Trinity

Page

2017

EJPR

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“…29 The proposition ∃pp is vacuous in ∃pp < ∃pp since substituting any proposition A for ∃pp in the grounds results in a true grounding claim anywhere A holds. 27 It is important to "modalize" here since otherwise, we might get that we can freely substitute facts for A, but only because there is an insufficient slate of available facts to put in the place of A.…”

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“…I hope to explore this issue elsewhere. 29 The grounded fact might be such that it holds in no world other than the actual world. Say, for example, the grounded fact C is a rigidified fact holding only in the actual world.…”

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Emptying a Paradox of Ground

Woods

2017

J Philos Logic

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Sometimes a fact can play a role in a grounding explanation, but the particular content of that fact make no difference to the explanation-any fact would do in its place. I call these facts vacuous grounds. I show that applying the distinction between-vacuous grounds allows us to give a principled solution to Kit Fine and Stephen Kramer's paradox of (reflexive) ground. This paradox shows that on minimal assumptions about grounding and minimal assumptions about logic, we can show that grounding is reflexive, contra the intuitive character of grounds. I argue that we should never have accepted that grounding is irreflexive in the first place; the intuitions that support the irreflexive intuition plausibly only require that grounding be non-vacuously irreflexive. Fine and Kramer's paradox relies, essentially, on a case of vacuous grounding and is thus no problem for this account. Keywords Grounding · Paradoxes of ground · IrreflexivityInterest in the putatively explanatory relation of metaphysical grounding and, in particular, its "logic" has recently been the focus of much attention. 1 Grounding has often been taken to be a strict partial order-i.e. to be an irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive relation. However, there have been important challenges to the claim that 1 See [24] for a recent survey, [7,26,27] for the kick-off of the contemporary research program, and [23,26] for a defense of the coherence of the notion and that it is an explanatory relation.

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Grounding in the image of causation

Cited by 345 publications

References 79 publications

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

The ‘Power’-ful Trinity

Emptying a Paradox of Ground

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