Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid

Chang, Ruth

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0092-z

Cited by 90 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…We should not, however, take indeterminacy to be a decisive reason to abandon attempts to identify substantial principles the application of which helps us in making good rationing decisions. The first solution to explore for those who value decision-guiding principles is instead to explore the possibility of hybrid theories of healthcare rationing that on one hand consists of substantial principles the application of which can identify a set of eligible rationing decisions, and on the other hand tells us which process to use in order to identify a unique element in this set in case there are more than one element in it 14 15. Such theory can either use a procedural approach as its base and complement this with constraints5 or it can use substantial principles as the base and complement these with a view of how to deal with indeterminacy.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The limited impact of indeterminacy for healthcare rationing: how indeterminacy problems show the need for a hybrid theory, but nothing more

Herlitz

2015

J Med Ethics

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A notorious debate in the ethics of healthcare rationing concerns whether to address rationing decisions with substantial principles or with a procedural approach. One major argument in favour of procedural approaches is that substantial principles are indeterminate so that we can reasonably disagree about how to apply them. To deal with indeterminacy, we need a just decision process. In this paper I argue that it is a mistake to abandon substantial principles just because they are indeterminate. It is true that reasonable substantial principles designed to deal with healthcare rationing can be expected to be indeterminate. Yet, the indeterminacy is only partial. In some situations we can fully determine what to do in light of the principles, in some situations we cannot. The conclusion to draw from this fact is not that we need to develop procedural approaches to healthcare rationing, but rather that we need a more complex theory in which both substantial principles and procedural approaches are needed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The limited impact of indeterminacy for healthcare rationing: how indeterminacy problems show the need for a hybrid theory, but nothing more

Herlitz

2015

J Med Ethics

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“…It is standardly assumed in moral philosophy that there is a necessary connection between the concept of normative reasons and the concept of practical rationality. Moreover, a particular instance of this notion is presumed in much theorizing 1 For related but distinct views, see Lillehammer (1999a, 186-190) and Chang (2013). 70 Caj Sixten Strandberg about reasons: If an agent S has a reason to φ, then she needs to have some appropriate desire with regard to φing if she is to count as fully rational.…”

Section: Internalism Externalism and Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

Strandberg¹

2018

Dialectica

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A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.

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“…Others will provide suggestive abstract models of value relations that make room for parity (Chang, 2002a(Chang, , 2005Rabinowicz, 2008Rabinowicz, , 2011Rabinowicz, , 2012Gert, 2004), while yet others will attempt to give formal (Carlson, 2010) or informal (Andreou, 2015) accounts of parity in other terms. 10 Still others, and probably in the end most persuasive, will provide arguments showing that there is important philosophical work that only parity can do or can do better than other standard notions (attempts made in Chang, 2009Chang, , 2012Chang, , 2013aChang, , 2013b. The case for parity has to be made piecemeal, but, like the trichotomist addressing the dichotomist, the tetrachotomist begins with the fact that there is nothing in our concepts of comparability and incomparability that rules out the possibility of a fourth basic relation.…”

Section: Paritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Parity, Imprecise Comparability and the Repugnant Conclusion

Chang

2016

Theoria

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This article explores the main similarities and differences between Derek Parfit's notion of imprecise comparability and a related notion I have proposed of parity. I argue that the main difference between imprecise comparability and parity can be understood by reference to 'the standard view'. The standard view claims that 1) differences between cardinally ranked items can always be measured by a scale of units of the relevant value, and 2) all rankings proceed in terms of the trichotomy of 'better than', 'worse than', and 'equally good'. Imprecise comparability, which can be understood in terms of the more familiar notions of cardinality and incommensurability, rejects only the first claim while parity rejects both claims of the standard view.I then argue that insofar as those attracted to imprecise comparability assume that all rankings are trichotomous, as Parfit appears to, the view should be rejected. This is because imprecise equality is not a form of equality but is a sui generis 'fourth' basic way in which items can be ranked. We should, I argue, understand imprecise equality as parity, and imprecise comparability as entailing 'tetrachotomy' -that if two items are comparable, one must better than, worse than, equal to, or on a par with the other. Thus those attracted to the idea that cardinality can be imprecise should abandon trichotomy and accept parity and tetrachotomy instead.Finally, I illustrate the difference between Parfit's trichotomous notion of imprecise comparability and parity by examining how each notion might be employed in different solutions to the problem posed by the Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics. I suggest that parity provides the arguably more ecumenical solution to the problem.

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Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid

Cited by 90 publications

References 26 publications

The limited impact of indeterminacy for healthcare rationing: how indeterminacy problems show the need for a hybrid theory, but nothing more

The limited impact of indeterminacy for healthcare rationing: how indeterminacy problems show the need for a hybrid theory, but nothing more

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

Parity, Imprecise Comparability and the Repugnant Conclusion

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