Group assertion and group silencing

Townsend, Leo

doi:10.1016/j.langcom.2019.08.003

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…But what do we mean, exactly, when we say that a group makes a claim, and when we say that a group lies? While the analysis of group action, belief, justification, and knowledge has attracted a lot of philosophical attention, 2 we have seen so far only a few attempts to characterise group assertion (Meijers 1999(Meijers , 2007Tollefsen 2020;Lackey 2017Lackey , 2020bTownsend 2018;Ludwig 2019; and group lying (Staffel 2018, Lackey 2018a, Hormio 2022.…”

Section: Group Action and Group Misconductmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some authors before me (Hughes 1984;Tollefsen 2007;Meijers 2007;Fricker 2012;Lackey 2017;Ludwig 2017, chaps. 13-14;Townsend 2018) have attempted to characterise group assertion and group testimony. Rather than tiring the reader by reviewing the strength and weaknesses of each view, I will take Lackey's proposal as a point of reference to develop mine.…”

Section: Two Kinds Of Group Assertionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Group Assertions and Group Lies

Marsili

2023

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Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to define group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I offer a definition that drops condition (i) and significantly broadens condition (ii).

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Section: Group Action and Group Misconductmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Two Kinds Of Group Assertionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Group Assertions and Group Lies

Marsili

2023

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“…Philosophers' catching-up game with what "ordinary language" actually means and how to best theorise it thus continues and, recently, picks up speed. Benefitting from inspiring insights from, broadly speaking, sociolinguists such as Herbert Clark, Erving Goffman, and Stephen Levinson, philosophers have turned their attention to group speech acts (Hughes 1984;Lackey 2018;Ludwig 2020;Townsend 2020); complex "polylogical" exchanges (Lewiński 2021a, b); speech act pluralism and illocutionary pluralism in particular (Cappelen and Lepore 2005;Egan 2009;Johnson 2019;Lewiński 2021a;Sbisà 2013); the complexities of uptake (McDonald 2022;Sbisà 2009;Witek 2022a); varied functions of speech acts in online contexts (Connolly 2022;Labinaz and Sbisà 2021;Marsili 2021;McDonald 2021) and other related phenomena populating our daily communicative lives.…”

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confidence: 99%

Norms of Public Argument: A Speech Act Perspective

Lewiński

Cepollaro

Oswald

et al. 2023

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Discursive paternalism

Townsend¹

2021

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According to an influential tradition in speech act theory, it takes more than linguistic mastery and normative entitlement to do things with words; one's words must also be given a suitable reception or social uptake. Working within this tradition, I identify and characterize the phenomenon of discursive paternalism. Discursive paternalism occurs when a party to a speaker's act takes control of the uptake the act receives, with the aim of curating the speaker's commitments. This is done without the prior consent or knowledge of the speaker, and for the perceived good of the speaker. I describe three distinct forms of discursive paternalism, which differ in terms of the role played by the paternalist, and the kind of authority he lays claim to in performing that role.

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Group assertion and group silencing

Cited by 3 publications

References 19 publications

Group Assertions and Group Lies

Group Assertions and Group Lies

Norms of Public Argument: A Speech Act Perspective

Discursive paternalism

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