2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.11.009
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
14
0
1

Year Published

2012
2012
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
7

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 28 publications
(16 citation statements)
references
References 31 publications
1
14
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…The underlying logic of group lending is that the joint liability may leads to mitigate the moral hazard and adverse selection through peer monitoring and screening functions. Paal and Wiseman (2011) demonstrate that offering joint liability loan can bring a high profit to lender compared with the individual liability contracts. The joint liability is also a helpful tool to improve the performance of the group members.…”
Section: Social Intermediation Servicesmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…The underlying logic of group lending is that the joint liability may leads to mitigate the moral hazard and adverse selection through peer monitoring and screening functions. Paal and Wiseman (2011) demonstrate that offering joint liability loan can bring a high profit to lender compared with the individual liability contracts. The joint liability is also a helpful tool to improve the performance of the group members.…”
Section: Social Intermediation Servicesmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Fafchamps and Minten (2002) find that traders with a stronger social network earn higher profits by reducing transaction costs. Higher social capital also helps solve the enforcement problem in risksharing arrangements, because it makes individuals creditworthy (Karlan, 2007;Paal & Wiseman, 2011) and helps recover from negative calamities quickly (Carter & Castillo, 2005).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We add to this literature by analyzing how social capital interacts with sequential lending, in particular how the nature of collusion affects repayment performance. In so doing this paper, along with Paal and Wiseman (2011), takes a step in reconciling the mixed results found in the empirical literature.…”
Section: Social Capitalmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Also, in contrast to Laffont and Rey (2003), Bhole and Ogden (2010), Paal andWiseman (2011), andde Quidt et al (2012) we analyze sequential, rather than simultaneous lending schemes. Further, unlike Bhole and Ogden (2010) and Paal and Wiseman (2011), (i) we do not allow for repeated interactions but instead analyze a dynamic one-off interaction, and (ii) the magnitude of social sanctions is norm driven in our framework. We add to this literature by analyzing how social capital interacts with sequential lending, in particular how the nature of collusion affects repayment performance.…”
Section: Social Capitalmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation