Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9398-y

Cited by 64 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Every individual bears the full costs of its investments, whereas the benefits partly spill over to the rest of the group (Katz, Nitzan, & Rosenberg, 1990;Esteban & Ray, 2001;Epstein & Mealem, 2009;Nitzan & Ueda, 2009). Depending on the sharing rule applied, this problem may also exist for a private good (Nitzan, 1991a(Nitzan, , 1991bEsteban & Ray, 2001;Nitzan & Ueda, 2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Depending on the sharing rule applied, this problem may also exist for a private good (Nitzan, 1991a(Nitzan, , 1991bEsteban & Ray, 2001;Nitzan & Ueda, 2009). In the recent literature, Baik (2008), Epstein andMealem (2009), andLee (2008) have presented contest models with group-specific public goods. A major result in Baik (2008) is that in a model with linear effort costs and additively linear impact functions only those group members with the highest valuation of the rent make positive investments in the contest.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…With several group members having the maximal valuation among the group, there exist multiple equilibria, since the first order condition only defines the total effort spent by the group. Epstein and Mealem (2009) stick to the assumption of additive separability of individual effort in the group-production functions but introduce decreasing returns to investment.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts

Kolmar

Rommeswinkel

2010

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts AbstractUsually, groups increase their productivity by the specialization of their group members. In these cases, group output is no longer simply a sum of individual outputs. We analyze contests with group-specific public goods that allow for different degrees of complementarity between group members' efforts. More specifically, we use a Tullock contest success function and a CES-impact function. We show that in equilibrium the degree of complementarity is irrelevant if groups do not differ in size and group members have an identical valuation of the public good. The equilibrium is discontinuous as the CES function converges to the CobbDouglas case. Except for the effects at the discontinuity, higher complementarity tends to favor larger groups. In groups with diverse valuations, higher complementarity also leads to higher similarity in group members' efforts, which however is not necessarily an advantage for a more diverse group.JEL-Code: D74, H41.

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Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts

Kolmar

Rommeswinkel

2010

SSRN Journal

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“…In this example, we compare the two polar sortings. 4 For a similar setup, see also Epstein and Mealem (2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities

Brookins

Lightle

Ryvkin

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Second, consumption externalities have an additional e¤ect based on private consumption. Therefore, an agent that consumes the 1 Contests have also been considered where the prize is a public good (Katz et al, 1990;Ursprung, 1990;Baik, 1993;Gradstein, 1993;Linster, 1993;Riaz et al, 1995;Baik, 2008;Epstein and Mealem, 2009). The conventional approach is to allow individuals (within a group) to independently invest in e¤ort where the group with the largest aggregate e¤ort wins the group-speci…c public good.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling Externalities in the Presence of Rent Seeking

MacKenzie

2009

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractContests are a common method to describe the distribution of many di¤erent types of rents. Yet in many of these situations the utilisation of the prize plays an important role in determining agents'payo¤s and incentives. In this paper, we investigate the incentives to expend e¤ort for a prize that produces consumption externalities and consider alternative regulatory policies. We …nd relatively more global consumption externalities will increase (decrease) rent seeking when consumption externalities are negative (positive). We show how introducing Pigouvian taxation (possibly with revenue transfer) and Coasean bargaining alters equilibrium e¤ort and payo¤s. Pigouvian taxation tends to reduce both e¤ort and payo¤s whereas this is not always the case for Coasean bargaining. In the presence of suf…ciently large consumption externalities, establishing Pigouvian taxation coupled with some element of lump-sum transfer may reduce costly rent seeking e¤ort and improve the welfare of some agents compared to other approaches.

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Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding

Abstract: Contests, Rent seeking, Public good, Heterogeneity, Free-riding, Orchestration of interest groups, D72, C72, H41,

Cited by 64 publications

References 16 publications

Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts

Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts

Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities

Controlling Externalities in the Presence of Rent Seeking

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