Groupon in the Air: A three-stage auction framework for Spectrum Group-buying

Lin, Peng; Feng, Xiaojun; Zhang, Qian; Hamdi, Mounir

doi:10.1109/infcom.2013.6567002

Cited by 61 publications

(74 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Following the same design methodology, Wei et al [6] designed SHIELD that improves spectrum utilization and buyer satisfaction compared with VERITAS and SMALL. Inspired by the group-buying service on the Internet, Lin et al [7] designed a three-state auction, called TASG that allows a leader in each group to conduct an outer auction for aggregating the bids within the group. Along this line, Yang et al [8] designed TRUBA that significantly increases revenue.…”

Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum Auctions Under Physical Interference Model

Zhang

Yang

Lin

et al. 2017

IEEE Trans. Cogn. Commun. Netw.

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Spectrum auctions provide a platform for licensed spectrum users to share their underutilized spectrum with unlicensed users. Existing spectrum auctions either use the protocol interference model to characterize interference relationship as binary, or do not allow the primary and secondary users to share channels simultaneously. To fill this void, we design SPA, a spectrum single-sided auction under the physical interference model, which considers the interference to be accumulative. We prove that SPA is computationally efficient, individualrational, and truthful. Results from extensive simulation studies demonstrate that, SPA achieves higher revenue, spectrum utilization and buyer satisfaction ratio, compared with the existing auctions modified with the physical interference model.

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Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum Auctions Under Physical Interference Model

Zhang

Yang

Lin

et al. 2017

IEEE Trans. Cogn. Commun. Netw.

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“…Therefore, the overlay operator has interest to let the users group together, and share as much as possible the same overlay links in order to (i) reduce the number of contracts it has to manage with the underlying ISPs, and hence the management costs, and (ii) take advantage of the multiplexing gain. At the same time, inspired by the emerging group-buying services on the Internet, e.g., Groupon [37], network users have an incentive to voluntarily group together (in a cooperative way) to acquire and share the bandwidth/connectivity sold by virtual operators. In our work, we show that the advantage can indeed be consistent in all considered network scenarios.…”

Section: Application Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative network design: A Nash bargaining solution approach

et al. 2015

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The Network Design problem has received increasing attention in recent years. Previous works have addressed this problem considering almost exclusively networks designed by selfish users, which can be consistently suboptimal. This paper addresses the network design issue using cooperative game theory, which permits to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among users. Both the Nash bargaining solution and the Shapley value are widely applicable concepts for solving these games. However, the Shapley value presents several drawbacks in this context.For this reason, we solve the cooperative network design game using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) concept. More specifically, we extend the NBS approach to the case of multiple players and give an explicit expression for users' cost allocations. We further provide a distributed algorithm for computing the Nash bargaining solution. Then, we compare the NBS to the Shapley value and the Nash equilibrium solution in several network scenarios, including real ISP topologies, showing its advantages and appealing properties in terms of cost allocation to users and computation time to obtain the solution.Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed Nash bargaining solution approach permits to allocate costs fairly to users in a reasonable computation time, thus representing a very effective framework for the design of efficient and stable networks.

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“…Since a single EV can only provide limited electric energy resources, the proposed auction based mechanism should offer enough incentive to encourage a large number of EVs to participate in the V2G system. Inspired by Groupon for spectrum auction [2], we propose a group-selling strategy for the V2G DRM problem. In the proposed strategy a feedback based price scheme is designed to motivate the EVs to participate the auctions by taking into account the cost of electric energy generation and the charging costs of the EVs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Incentivized Auction-Based Group-Selling Approach for Demand Response Management in V2G Systems

Zhang

Leng

Maharjan

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans. Ind. Inf.

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Abstract-Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) system with efficient Demand Response Management (DRM) is critical to solve the problem of supplying electricity by utilizing surplus electricity available at EVs. An incentivilized DRM approach is studied to reduce the system cost and maintain the system stability. EVs are motivated with dynamic pricing determined by the group-selling based auction. In the proposed approach, a number of aggregators sit on the first level auction responsible to communicate with a group of EVs. EVs as bidders consider Quality of Energy (QoE) requirements and report interests and decisions on the bidding process coordinated by the associated aggregator. Auction winners are determined based on the bidding prices and the amount of electricity sold by the EV bidders. We investigate the impact of the proposed mechanism on the system performance with maximum feedback power constraints of aggregators. The designed mechanism is proven to have essential economic properties. Simulation results indicate the proposed mechanism can reduce the system cost and offer EVs significant incentives to participate in the V2G DRM operation.

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Groupon in the Air: A three-stage auction framework for Spectrum Group-buying

Cited by 61 publications

References 10 publications

Spectrum Auctions Under Physical Interference Model

Spectrum Auctions Under Physical Interference Model

Cooperative network design: A Nash bargaining solution approach

An Incentivized Auction-Based Group-Selling Approach for Demand Response Management in V2G Systems

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