Guidance for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework

“…If the authenticator uses a key derivation function to derive additional keying material, the authenticator is trusted to distribute the derived keying material only to the appropriate party that is known to the peer, and no other party. When this approach is used, care must be taken to ensure that the resulting key management system meets all of the principles in [RFC4962], confirming that keys used to protect data are to be known only by the peer and authenticator. While the authenticator can implement some EAP methods locally and use those methods to authenticate local users, it can at the same time act as a pass-through for other users and methods, forwarding EAP packets back and forth between the backend authentication server and the peer.…”

“…Similarly, if a peer is compromised or stolen, an attacker can obtain credentials needed to communicate with one or more authenticators. A mandatory requirement from [RFC4962] Section 3:…”

“…It also provides a detailed security analysis, describing the conditions under which the requirements described in "Guidance for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management" [RFC4962] can be satisfied.…”

Handover Key Management and Re-Authentication Problem Statement

“…This section draws from the guidance provided in [RFC4962] to further define the security goals to be achieved by a complete reauthentication keying solution. Any key must have a well-defined scope and must be used in a specific context and for the intended use.…”

“…However, those solutions are either EAP-method specific or EAP lower-layer specific. Furthermore, these solutions do not deal with scenarios involving handovers to new authenticators, or they do not conform to the AAA keying requirements specified in [RFC4962].…”