Guilt in voting and public good games

Abstract

This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of morally difficult group decisions. We study a threshold public good game with moral costs. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we assume that these costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts.The first one is a standard cost term. The second, shared guilt, decreases in the number of supporters. The third hinges on the notion of being pivotal. We analyze equilibrium predictions, isolate the causal effects of guilt sharing, and compare results to standard utilitarian and nonconsequentialist approaches. As interventions, we study information release, feedback, and fostering individual moral standards.JEL Classification: D02, D03, D23, D63, D82.

Moral Transgressions by Groups: What Drives Individual Voting Behavior?

“…In our first treatment SIM, subjects vote simultaneously and independently for or against taking the money (YES or NO). We find that the number of subjects voting YES increases in the threshold k. This result is in line with predictions from a recent game-theoretic model by Rothenhäusler, Schweizer, and Szech (2018), where individuals incur a moral cost if and only if they vote for the moral transgression and it is actually carried out in the course of the group decision. 2 Furthermore, they assume that these moral costs decline in the number of other affirmative votes for the moral transgression, which they refer to as guilt sharing.…”

“…Our first treatment SIM, where all voters are unconditional, tests a proposition developed by Rothenhäusler, Schweizer, and Szech (2018). The additional treatments designed to identify guilt sharing and preferences for consensual voting are related to the literature on the diffusion of responsibility through markets (Falk and Szech, 2013;Bartling, Weber, and Yao, 2015b).…”

“…Treatment SIM In this treatment all three group members are unconditional voters in the sense that none of them can condition her own vote on the votes of the other two group members. This treatment hence captures the case of simultaneous voting as considered in the theoretical framework by Rothenhäusler, Schweizer, and Szech (2018). They consider a group of n ≥ 1 agents voting on a moral transgression that yields the same monetary payoff for each group member, and which is implemented if there are at least k votes in favor of it.…”

A little good is good enough: Ethical consumption, cheap excuses, and moral self-licensing

“…Recent contributions from economics include Sobel [27], Falk and Szech [28], Kirchler et al [29], and Pigors and Rockenbach [30] on market trading and morals. Falk and Szech [31] and Rothenhäusler et al [32] have studied morals in group voting. Kerschbamer et al [33], Bartling et al [34], and Friedrichsen and Engelmann [35] have considered ethical consumption and/or morally relevant credence goods.…”

A Little Good Is Good Enough: Ethical Consumption, Cheap Excuses, and Moral Self-Licensing

“…This fits well to other recent studies linking real economic behavior to personality facets, such asDeckers et al (2016) andAlbrecht et al (2016). SeeRothenhäusler et al (2016) for incorporating such moral heterogeneity into an institution design model.13 Recent contributions are e.g.,Sobel (2010),Falk and Szech (2013),Kirchler et al (2016),Pigors and Rockenbach (2016),Falk and Szech (2014),Rothenhäusler et al (2015),Kerschbamer et al (2016),Bartling et al (2015),Friedrichsen and Engelmann (2014).14 Subjects had a 1 out of 25 chance to actually receive their selected products.…”