Guinea-Bissau Since Independence: A Decade of Domestic Power Struggles

Forrest, Joshua B.

doi:10.1017/s0022278x00007618

Cited by 20 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…This is obviously an explosive combination. For a discussion of the grievances this incongruity can generate, see Forrest 1987 mean Coups or Rebellions Table 1). i first run two sets of estimations (models 1-7) that regress successful coups (GroupScoup) and group rebellions (GroupRebel) on an epr group's access to the central government, while also including various control variables.…”

Section: Empirical Analysis Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa

Roessler¹

2011

World Pol.

303

242

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Why do rulers employ ethnic exclusion at the risk of civil war? Focusing on the region of sub-Saharan Africa, the author attributes this costly strategy to the commitment problem that arises in personalist regimes between elites who hold joint control of the state's coercive apparatus. As no faction can be sure that others will not exploit their violent capabilities to usurp power, elites maneuver to protect their privileged position and safeguard against others' first-a rising internal threat, rulers move to eliminate their rivals to guarantee their personal and political survival. But the cost of such a strategy, especially when carried out along ethnic lines, is that it increases the risk of a future civil war. To test this argument, the author employs the Ethnic Power Relations data set combined with original data on the ethnicity of conspirators of coups and rebellions in Africa. He finds that in Africa ethnic exclusion substitutes civil war risk for coup risk. And rulers are significantly more likely to exclude their coconspirators—the very friends and allies who helped them come to power—than other included groups, but at the cost of increasing the risk of a future civil war with their former allies. In the first three years after being purged from the central government, coconspirators and their coethnics are sixteen times more likely to rebel than when they were represented at the apex of the regime.

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Section: Empirical Analysis Research Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…lelyveld 1982. 45 invaluable sources on these cases include the following:Titley 2002;Decalo 1995;ellis 1999;Burr and Collins 1999;Decalo 1997;Prunier 2009;Reyntjens 2009;Forrest 2003;and langer 2004. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa

Roessler¹

2011

World Pol.

303

242

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“…With 80 per cent of the rice normally being grown by the Balanta, their discontent was directly transmitted to the soldiers, the vast majority of whom continued to retain direct ties with their rural homes, so that these economic and ethnic variables merged to further prepare the political stage for military intervention. (Forrest 1987:102)…”

Section: Rural Vs Urban Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

More than Elections: Rural Support and Regime Stability in Africa

Rabinowitz¹

2018

Afr. stud. rev.

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Abstract:It is generally recognized that rural constituents are critical for winning elections. Development economists also recognize the importance of pro-agricultural policies to economic growth. Yet, little attention has been paid to the effect of rural politics on regime stability. Against conventional wisdom, this article argues that leaders who support rural areas and suppress urban demands are better able to stabilize the state and avoid coups. Because Ghana was able to politically stabilize after a period of state decay and five coups, the article presents an in-depth analysis of the tactical decisions made by the Ghanaian head of state who presided over these changes, John Jerry Rawlings. Using process-tracing, the study illustrates the importance of rural coalitions to stability and regime success.

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“…He was able to extend and consolidate his usurped power, centralizing the PAIGC further and increasingly using the party instead of the military for personal advancement. In 1984, Vieira introduced a new constitution which granted himself almost absolute power (Forrest, Guinea-Bissau (1989) Gambia (1986-87, 1989 Mali (1982) Benin (1988) Mauritania (1989, 1993) Niger (1999) Guinea (1986, 1993 Burkina Faso (1997) Sierra Leone (1983( -84, 1987( ) Ghana (1989 Togo (1995) Nigeria (1986( ) Gabon (1999 Central African Republic (1987) Zaire (1980,1984) Kenya 1996) Tanzania (1986,1996) Mozambique (1993) Zambia (1985, 1987, 1993-95, 1999+ ) Zimbabwe (1994) Malawi (1991) Botswana (1998) Malagasy Republic (1988, 1993) Mauritius (1984, 1993 Source: CACAO data set (Martin, 2005), Armed Conflict 1946-2001 dataset (Gleditsch et al, 2002). 1987).…”

Section: Political Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foreign Economic Liberalization and Peace: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa

Bussmann

Schneider

Wiesehomeier

2005

European Journal of International Relations

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A typical adage of the globalization literature is that foreign economic liberalization undermines the social fabric of developing countries. This article examines this claim for the sub-Saharan African countries and thus the continent that experienced both low economic growth and a high incidence of armed conflict during the 1990s. Our results yield support for the assertion that economic openness durably pacifies countries once the restructuring of the economy is over. We can, however, not reject the possibility that the distributional consequences of foreign economic liberalization increase the risk of civil war during the implementation of the reform measures. We contrast this 'distributional' model with alternative explanations such as the role of the International Monetary Fund and the level of democracy. A comparative case study on Guinea and Guinea-Bissau lends some illustrative evidence to the claim that compensating the losers of globalization can pacify intrastate relations.

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Guinea-Bissau Since Independence: A Decade of Domestic Power Struggles

Cited by 20 publications

References 1 publication

The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa

The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa

More than Elections: Rural Support and Regime Stability in Africa

Foreign Economic Liberalization and Peace: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa

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