Guns, Food, and Liability to Attack in War

Fabre, Cécile

doi:10.1086/649218

Cited by 74 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…As a number of scholars have persuasively argued (e.g., McMahan 2004;Rodin 2005;Fabre 2009), the notion of combatant does not properly comprise sufficient moral conditions for being a legitimate target to defensive force. If the canon of responsibility provides the moral basis of liability in wartime, besides being a guide to the combatant's conscience, it has important implications for the conceptualization of civilian and business responsibilities in wartime.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But, given the other constraints of jus in bello, namely, minimal force, necessity, and proportionality, it is highly unlikely that civilians will be permissible targets, even under the canon of moral responsibility. For, a civilian's degree of liability will be typically so low that it would be disproportionate and unnecessary to use lethal force against him (Fabre 2009). …”

Section: Immunity and Responsibility In Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Fabre (2009) andMcMahan (2004) suggest, contributions to the war effort by civilians may be too remote and indirect to meet the requirements of proportionality, minimal force, and necessity. But unlike civilians, business firms may make significant contributions to warfare.…”

Section: War Justice and Corporate Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fabre (2009) argues that neither the permissibility of civilians' actions nor whether they are liable to attack depends on whether civilians are suppliers of military resources or suppliers of welfare resources: although civilian suppliers on the just side act permissibly and those on the unjust side act impermissibly, none on either side is liable to attack. I shall address this concern in the next section of this article.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Ethics of Business in Wartime

Alzola

2011

J Bus Ethics

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The orthodox account of the morality of war holds that the responsibility for resorting to war rests on the state's political authorities and the responsibility for how the war is waged rests only on the state's army and, thus, business firms have no special obligations in wartime. The purpose of this article is to reconsider the ethical responsibilities of business firms in wartime. I defend the claim that a plausible standard of liability in war must integrate the degree of the agent's contributions to posing an unjust threat, the nature of agent's behavior, and his/her intentions. If these premises are correct, it follows that the moral obligations of civilians and business corporations are fundamentally altered by war. Taking into consideration their relative contributions to the war effort, a taxonomy of business firms is developed.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Immunity and Responsibility In Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: War Justice and Corporate Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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The Ethics of Business in Wartime

Alzola

2011

J Bus Ethics

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“…20 The idea that one has to distinguish people who aid ''the soldier qua human being'' from people who are ''aiding the soldier qua soldier or fighting man,'' to use Jeffrie G. Murphy's (1973, 534) words, has always been quite popular, and rightly so. Cécile Fabre (2009) has recently argued that it is not correct that civilians who supply soldiers only with food are not liable to attack. I agree, since, as she correctly points out, some ways of supplying soldiers with food are helping them as soldiers.…”

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confidence: 99%

Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants

Steinhoff

2012

J Ethics

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According to the dominant position in the just war tradition from Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no ''moral equality of combatants.'' That is, on the traditional view the combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war-but not vice versa (barring certain qualifications). I shall argue here, however, that in the large number of wars (and in practically all modern wars) where the combatants on the justified side violate the rights of innocent people (''collateral damage''), these combatants are in fact liable to attack by the combatants on the unjustified side. I will support this view with a rights-based account of liability to attack and then defend it against a number of objections raised in particular by Jeff McMahan. The result is that the thesis of the moral equality of combatants holds good for a large range of armed conflicts while the opposing thesis is of very limited practical relevance.

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Collectivism and Reductivism in the Ethics of War

Frowe¹

2016

A Companion to Applied Philosophy

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Guns, Food, and Liability to Attack in War

Cited by 74 publications

References 13 publications

The Ethics of Business in Wartime

The Ethics of Business in Wartime

Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants

Collectivism and Reductivism in the Ethics of War

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