Hacking Nuclear Stability: Wargaming Technology, Uncertainty, and Escalation

This paper proposes a comprehensive research program for determining the epistemological foundations of analytic wargaming. Wargaming has been used in military, government, and private sectors for decades, with tens of millions of dollars spent annually on it. In light of the changing strategic circumstances of the twenty-first century, it has only become more popular. However, the epistemological foundations of the method are poorly understood. Many professional wargamers contend that wargaming is an “art” and thus unable to be systemically evaluated. Recent work by a small coterie of international relations scholars has contended that wargaming can be reconciled with social science, typically by evaluating wargaming according to experimental standards. However, this solution strips wargames of most of their unique features and cannot explain why some of the most prominent wargames in history produced meaningful results. In this paper, I argue that in the attempt to better understand wargaming’s epistemology, scholars should begin by recognizing the prominent features of wargames and research each of these to determine if and how wargames produce rigorous knowledge. In making this argument, I identify five distinct “methodological machineries” of wargaming—the recurring processes through which wargames may produce knowledge—that distinguish wargaming from other social science methods: (i) they are representative, (ii) they feature consequential decisions made by human players, (iii) they are adjudicated, (iv) they are immersive, and (v) they are bespoke designs. I show how each of these machineries offers potential opportunities and dangers in the production of knowledge through the method of wargaming. In outlining these distinct features, I offer a clear and viable research program for epistemologists of wargaming.

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Diplomacy by committee: Assessing resolve and costly signals in group settings

Wayne,

Mukaigawara,

Kertzer

et al. 2024

American J Political Sci

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Assessing resolve and interpreting costly signals are crucial tasks for leaders engaging in international diplomacy. However, leaders rarely make these decisions in isolation, relying on advisers to help assess adversary intentions. How do group dynamics change the way costly signals are interpreted? We field a large‐scale group experiment to examine how assessments of resolve vary across group settings. We find groups make significantly higher initial assessments of adversary resolve than individuals do, but also update their beliefs less after receiving new information. In small group contexts, first impressions may play a stronger role in shaping beliefs than any signals—costly or otherwise—that come afterwards. This has important implications for our understanding of signaling, providing further evidence that costly signals are less straightforward than often assumed.

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Hacking Nuclear Stability: Wargaming Technology, Uncertainty, and Escalation

Cited by 4 publications

References 73 publications

The digital cult of the offensive and the US military

The digital cult of the offensive and the US military

The Methodological Machinery of Wargaming: A Path toward Discovering Wargaming’s Epistemological Foundations

Diplomacy by committee: Assessing resolve and costly signals in group settings

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