Hallucination And Imagination

Allen, Keith

doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.984312

Cited by 55 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…That is, the dialectic here is further complicated by certain disjunctivist theories of perception, which deny that veridical and hallucinatory experiences are of the same fundamental kind(Martin 2004(Martin , 2006. This is particularly pertinent in light of the recent attempt to provide a positive disjunctivist analysis of hallucination in terms of sensory forms of imagination(Allen 2015). Again, on this view, hallucination and imagination models of dreaming would amount to the same thesis.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming

Whiteley

2020

Philos Stud

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Aphantasia is a recently discovered disorder characterised by the total incapacity to generate visual forms of mental imagery. This paper proposes that aphantasia raises important theoretical concerns for the ongoing debate in the philosophy and science of consciousness over the nature of dreams. Recent studies of aphantasia and its neurobehavioral correlates reveal that the majority of aphantasics, whilst unable to produce visual imagery while awake, nevertheless retain the capacity to experience rich visual dreams. This finding constitutes a novel explanandum for theories of dreaming. Specifically, I argue that the recent dream reports of aphantasics constitute an empirical challenge to the emerging family of views which claim that dreams are essentially imaginative experiences, constitutively involving the kinds of mental imagery which aphantasics, ex-hypothesi, lack. After presenting this challenge in the context of Jonathan Ichikawa’s recent arguments for this view, I argue that this empirical challenge may be overcome if the imagination theorist abandons Ichikawa’s account of dreaming in favour of a modified version. This involves the claim that dreams are essentially inactive and constitutively involve non voluntary forms of imagination. I conclude with a suggestion for further research which can test the viability of this alternative hypothesis, and move the debate forward.

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confidence: 94%

Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming

Whiteley

2020

Philos Stud

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“…A similar approach has been advocated in the hallucinations literature. There, it is sometimes argued that hallucinations (or at least a subclass of them) are phenomenally indistinguishable from perceptual experiences, and thus are fundamentally the same kind of mental state (for some review and opposition, see Allen, ). Of course, hallucinations are not normal perceptual experiences; they are aberrant perceptual experiences.…”

Section: Why Conscious Judgements For Beliefs?mentioning

confidence: 99%

A new defence of doxasticism about delusions: The cognitive phenomenological defence

Clutton

2018

Mind & Language

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Clinicians and cognitive scientists typically conceive of delusions as doxastic—they view delusions as beliefs. But some philosophers have countered with anti‐doxastic objections: delusions cannot be beliefs because they fail the necessary conditions of belief. A common response involves meeting these objections on their own terms by accepting necessary conditions on belief but trying to blunt their force. I take a different approach by invoking a cognitive‐phenomenal view of belief and jettisoning the rational/behavioural conditions. On this view, the anti‐doxastic claims can be rejected outright, and doxasticism can be defended. I call this the cognitive phenomenological defence of doxasticism.

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“…Third, one might worry not about imaginings being voluntary or mental actions but that they are subject to the will. I am not persuaded that all imaginings are subject to the will (see Allen, , p. 295, for discussion), but in any case, presumably the thought is that imaginings one is directly aware of are, at least in principle, subject to the will. Unconscious imaginings fall outside the scope of this claim.…”

Section: Unconscious Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…She also notes, as does Walton, that we can find ourselves imagining, and be surprised at this. Several philosophers have appealed to involuntary imaginings in their work (e.g., Allen, ; Ichikawa, ), and though it may not be the most discussed case of imagining, it is imagining nonetheless. Unconscious imaginings are of this involuntary kind.…”

Section: Unconscious Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biased by our imaginings

Sullivan-Bissett

2018

Mind & Language

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I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I argue that my model accommodates characteristic features of implicit bias, does not face the problems of the doxastic model, and is uniquely placed to accommodate the structural heterogeneity in the category of implicit bias. Finally I turn to how my view relates to holding people accountable for their biases and what we know about intervention strategies.

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Hallucination And Imagination

Cited by 55 publications

References 34 publications

Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming

Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming

A new defence of doxasticism about delusions: The cognitive phenomenological defence

Biased by our imaginings

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