Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate this claim by reviewing the relevant literatures and addressing the criteria for considering a system special, the various operationalizations of self, and how the studies' findings relate to the conclusions drawn. The authors conclude that many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self.A basic goal of information-processing psychology is to characterize the computational architecture of the mind, that is, to delineate the components of the information-processing system and describe their functions. Within this common framework, theories differ according to how many distinct components are posited and how specialized their functions are. In the case of some kinds of human information processing, claims of extreme specialization have been made. Language, for example, is often said to be a product of systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general-purpose cognitive processing-in other words, language has been claimed to be special. Evidence for the claim that language is special includes its reliance on a network of perisylvian brain areas that are not needed for nonlinguistic sound recognition or vocalization and its species specificity. Face recognition is also considered special by many because it relies on parts of ventral visual cortex that are not needed for visual recognition of nonface objects and because face representation is more holistic than the representation of other objects.