Hannah Arendt, Liberalism, and Freedom from Politics

Abstract

Arendt presents her defense of political freedom as a challenge to the liberal convention, which allegedly conceptualizes freedom as "freedom from politics." But her comments on liberal theories of freedom are scattered and unsystematic, and they raise a series of questions. Is her understanding of liberal freedom accurate? If it is not, why does she misconstrue liberal freedom as she does? And does her limited understanding of liberalism undermine her defense of political freedom? This chapter aims to answer these questions. The first half clarifies Arendt's (mis-)understanding of liberal freedom. The latter half critically evaluates her challenge to liberal freedom and considers what is alive in it over a half-century later. enters the public realm, discloses oneself, speaks and acts before and among one's peers, and makes a unique contribution to the world one shares with others. No reader of "What is Freedom?" could fail to see that the author's sympathy is with the latter side. The essay attempts to bring the "old truism" to life and challenge the "liberal" convention. This effort is in line with Arendt's larger theoretical project to reclaim some aspects of the classical heritage under the radically different condition of post-totalitarian mass society.But while her challenge to the "liberal credo" in this way plays an important role in the argumentative strategy that she deploys in defense of political freedom, Arendt's critical engagement with her liberal opponents is surprisingly sparse. In "What Is Freedom?" she refers to Mill's On Liberty twice but does not consider him or any other liberal theorist in detail. 3 Instead, she briefly discusses the purportedly "liberal credo," characterizes it as conforming to the "tradition" of Western philosophy and political thought, and proceeds to reiterate her wellknown polemic against the anti-political bias supposedly animating the "tradition." She has