Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitutional Court (1918-1929)

Abstract

Este artículo examina las contribuciones de Hans Kelsen al establecimiento del primer Tribunal Constitucional en Austria, analizando las diferencias centrales entre el modelo kelseniano de tribunal constitucional y el modelo de su maestro alemán, el jurista Georg Jellinek, al tiempo en el que se enfoca en el trasfondo históricopolítico especifico de Austria que ejerció un influjo en la configuración e incluso en el colapso del Tribunal Constitucional. De manera distinta a la mayoría de trabajos dedicados a esta cuestión, este artículo le presta particular atención a la dimensión histórico-política tras los esfuerzos de Kelsen para crear un sistema serio de defensa jurídica de la Constitución Austríaca. En este sentido, el modelo kelseniano de tribunal constitucional se analiza en referencia al problema de proteger a la joven democracia austríaca, que surgió de las cenizas del Imperio Habsburgo, en contra de sus numerosos oponentes. Este problema se ubica en el centro de los trabajos de Kelsen sobre la democracia publicados en la década de 1920.

Oversight on the Constitutionality of Laws: A Case Study of the Jordanian Constitutional Court

“…It does not specify the mechanism of the appointment of members. 5 In addition, the appointment of all members of the Court by the Executive Authority makes the Court lose its independence and subjects it to government control, especially since the Jordanian Constitution provides that the Executive Authority is entrusted to the King and exercised through his Ministers. According to Nasrawin, 6 there is still a gap in the selection of members of the Constitutional Court, and there are no obvious procedural provisions in the Constitutional Court Law with regard to the nomination process or any probable role for elected members in this respect.…”

“…Under Article 58, the Jordanian Constitution entrusts the Constitutional Court the task of overseeing the constitutionality of the applicable laws and regulations and to interpret the provisions of the Constitution. 5 The Constitution also provides for the provisions of the formation of the Constitutional Court, its characteristics, jurisdiction, and mechanism for recourse to the Constitutional Court.…”

“…If the court considering the case decides not to refer the plea to the Court of Cassation, its decision may be appealed along with its final resolution issued on the subject of the lawsuit. 5 If the challenge of constitutionality is referred to the Court of Cassation, the Court of Cassation shall be held by a panel of at least 3 members and shall issue its decision within 30 days from the date of receipt of the application. If a decision is taken to refer the request to the Constitutional Court, in such case, it shall inform the parties about this decision.…”

The Institutional Foundations of the Uneven Global Spread of Constitutional Courts

“…Since the end of World War II, there has been a dramatic increase in the spread of constitutional courts worldwide. In 1949, only one advanced capitalist democracy—namely, Austria, for which Kelsen himself had written the Austrian Constitution of 1920, and served as a judge of the world’s first specialized constitutional court that became operational in the same year (Lagi 2012, 282–83)—had a specialized and centralized court for constitutional review. Although Czechoslovakia and Spain had also adopted the Kelsenian model and opened a constitutional court in 1921 and 1933, respectively, they had abolished it before 1949 (in 1948 and 1939, respectively).…”