Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems 1994
DOI: 10.1145/195473.195579
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Hardware support for fast capability-based addressing

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Cited by 77 publications
(51 citation statements)
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“…Otherwise, it is kept as simple as possible. It is inspired by both the M-Machine [6] and CHERI [9]. To avoid uninteresting details, we assume an infinite address space and unbounded integers.…”
Section: A Capability Machine With Local Capabilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Otherwise, it is kept as simple as possible. It is inspired by both the M-Machine [6] and CHERI [9]. To avoid uninteresting details, we assume an infinite address space and unbounded integers.…”
Section: A Capability Machine With Local Capabilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The jmp instruction updates the program counter to a requested location, but it is complicated by the presence of enter capabilities, modeled after the M-Machine's [6]. Enter capabilities cannot be used to read, write or execute and their address and range cannot be modified.…”
Section: Permission Hierarchymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…CHERI is also strongly influenced by M-Machine [13], which provided tagged memory in support of fine-grained memory capabilities. Whereas M-Machine implemented an asynchronous model (reasonably described as secure closures, combining code and data references in entry and return capabilities, allowing a single-instruction call/return mechanism), CheriBSD implements secure object invocation based on a TCB-maintained reliable return stack, and separate code and data capabilities.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We extend our CHERI ISA and processor prototype with sealed capabilities and hardwareaccelerated object invocation, and extend the CHERI software stack (LLVM compiler [30] and FreeBSD OS [33]) with a domain-transition calling convention and a userspace objectcapability model. While our approach learns from prior capability systems, such as HYDRA [58] and the M-Machine [13], our focus is on hybridization: how to incrementally deploy CHERI within current C-language TCBs with source-code and binary compatibility. We have targeted the most securitycritical TCBs (e.g., privileged software) and also the most vulnerable (e.g., compression libraries) while avoiding disruption to the remainder of the software stack.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%