Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference 2012
DOI: 10.1145/2228360.2228378
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Hardware Trojan horse benchmark via optimal creation and placement of malicious circuitry

Abstract: This paper proposes Hardware Trojan (HT) placement techniques that yield challenging HT detection benchmarks. We develop three types of one-gate HT benchmarks based on switching power, leakage power, and delay measurements that are commonly used in HT detection. In particular, we employ an iterative searching algorithm to find rarely switching locations, an aging-based approach to create ultralow power HT, and a backtracking-based reconvergence identification method to determine the non-observable delay paths.… Show more

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Cited by 44 publications
(39 citation statements)
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“…The HTs used in our experiments are obtained from two sources: the Trust-Hub website [18] and some related papers [3,[11][12][13]16], detailed in Appendix B. We do not directly conduct experiments on those circuits in which HTs are originally inserted, because verification tests required by both [11] and VeriTrust for HT detection are not available.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…The HTs used in our experiments are obtained from two sources: the Trust-Hub website [18] and some related papers [3,[11][12][13]16], detailed in Appendix B. We do not directly conduct experiments on those circuits in which HTs are originally inserted, because verification tests required by both [11] and VeriTrust for HT detection are not available.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given the huge state-space that HTs can hide within a reasonably sized circuit, attackers can easily employ a trigger condition that has extremely low probability to be activated with verification tests. Various HT designs have been shown in the literature (e.g., [16,17]) in recent years, and the Trust-Hub website [18] has released a set of HT benchmark circuits with different triggers and payloads.…”
Section: Hardware Trust Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Further works construct and detect HTs that use side channels [19], [20], [21]. Such HTs remain implicitly on, and have usually no effect on the normal functionality of the circuit.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%