Hardware Trojans

Abstract

Given the increasing complexity of modern electronics and the cost of fabrication, entities from around the globe have become more heavily involved in all phases of the electronics supply chain. In this environment, hardware Trojans (i.e., malicious modifications or inclusions made by untrusted third parties) pose major security concerns, especially for those integrated circuits (ICs) and systems used in critical applications and cyber infrastructure. While hardware Trojans have been explored significantly in academia over the last decade, there remains room for improvement. In this article, we examine the research on hardware Trojans from the last decade and attempt to capture the lessons learned. A comprehensive adversarial model taxonomy is introduced and used to examine the current state of the art. Then the past countermeasures and publication trends are categorized based on the adversarial model and topic. Through this analysis, we identify what has been covered and the important problems that are underinvestigated. We also identify the most critical lessons for those new to the field and suggest a roadmap for future hardware Trojan research.

A Modern Approach to IP Protection and Trojan Prevention: Split Manufacturing for 3D ICs and Obfuscation of Vertical Interconnects

“…Apart from IP protection, the possibility for HT insertion by an untrustworthy foundry also raises concerns, especially for military applications. ICs that are "bugged" with HTs may (i) deviate from their specified functionality, (ii) leak sensitive information, and/or (iii) become unreliable or fail at particular points in time [3]. Trojans can be broadly classified into digital Trojans and physical Trojans, depending on their payload and trigger mechanisms.…”

“…On the other hand, there are powerful attacks such as Meltdown [2], which skillfully exploit these very practices to extract sensitive data at runtime. Besides, malicious foundries may implement so-called hardware Trojans (HTs) which can help an adversary to extract sensitive data purposefully [3]. Apart from such concerns regarding the security and trustworthiness of hardware at runtime, protecting the hardware itself from threats such as piracy of design intellectual property (IP) or illegal overproduction is another challenge.…”

Large-Scale 3D Chips: Challenges and Solutions for Design Automation, Testing, and Trustworthy Integration

“…Components can be rendered unintentionally faulty/prone, via design or implementation bugs (e.g., Rowhammer [144]), but they can also be made intentionally and inherently faulty/prone (e.g., via hardware Trojans [145], see Section 5.4).…”

“…Hardware Trojans are another major concern for reliable and trustworthy chips; they are hardware modifications inserted by an untrustworthy third party in order to alter the chip's functionality, leak critical information, or degrade the chip's reliability and/or performance [145]. The detection of hardware Trojans, both at design and runtime, has recently gained more interest, and promising techniques have been proposed [116], [117], [118], [119], [145], [148], [152], [153].…”

“…The detection of hardware Trojans, both at design and runtime, has recently gained more interest, and promising techniques have been proposed [116], [117], [118], [119], [145], [148], [152], [153]. For example, simulation-based Trojan detection cannot guarantee full coverage within polynomial runtime, but Wei et al [153] demonstrate full coverage for industrial circuits within minutes by combining reverse engineering and formal verification.…”