2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.05.003
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Harmonization of the European balancing power auction: A game-theoretical and empirical investigation

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Cited by 22 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…They describe essential elements for scoring rules to ensure an efficient allocation. As shown in Ocker et al (2018), the Austrian and German aFRR auctions, with the two attributes power and energy, theoretically ensure an efficient market outcome. Nevertheless, empirical auction results point at a more rigorous investigation regarding the interplay of these two bid elements since they are not in line with the theoretic predictions.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…They describe essential elements for scoring rules to ensure an efficient allocation. As shown in Ocker et al (2018), the Austrian and German aFRR auctions, with the two attributes power and energy, theoretically ensure an efficient market outcome. Nevertheless, empirical auction results point at a more rigorous investigation regarding the interplay of these two bid elements since they are not in line with the theoretic predictions.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further, spot market prices are typically well explainable by fundamental factors (see, e.g., Bublitz et al, 2017; Kiesel & Paraschiv, 2017; Weron, 2014). Conversely, a challenge in forecasting balancing reserve market prices lies in the fact that they are hardly explainable by fundamental drivers (Kraft, Keles, & Fichtner, 2018; Ocker, Ehrhart, & Belica, 2018). However, Ocker and Ehrhart (2017) find evidence for collusion among market participants and serial correlation in the auction results of the secondary reserve market.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Literature on balancing markets is diverse. Since balancing market are still highly heterogeneous across countries (see, e.g., Ocker et al, 2016) a lot of studies address the different national balancing market designs (e.g., Müsgens et al, 2014;Ocker, 2017), the harmonization of market designs (e.g., Dallinger et al, 2018;Ocker et al, 2018a), the integration of balancing markets (e.g., Farahmand and Doorman, 2012) or whether the market design is suitable for participation of variable renewable energies (VRE, e.g., Fernandes et al, 2016). Regarding VRE, other studies focus on the interaction of an increasing share of VRE and the balancing requirements and costs (e.g., Gianfreda et al, 2018;Hirth and Ziegenhagen, 2015;Holttinen et al, 2011;Ocker and Ehrhart, 2017) or hydropower's ability and value in contributing to balance an increasing share of VRE (e.g., Dujardin et al, 2017;Graabak et al, 2019).…”
Section: Balancing Markets and Hydropower In The Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…By taking into account price expectations based on historic market outcomes in their theoretical model, they formulate a theoretical bidding strategy, which matches empirical balancing market results in these markets. Built upon this, Ocker et al (2018a) analyse if a change from pay-as-bid to uniform pricing as proposed by the European Commission would incentivise suppliers to reveal their true costs. However, their results show that under both pricing regimes (i.e., pay-as-bid and uniform pricing) suppliers do not reveal their actual cost.…”
Section: Balancing Markets and Hydropower In The Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%