Harnessing protest potential: Russian strategic culture and the colored revolutions

Abstract

The perceived threat posed to Russia from so-called colored revolutionspopular uprisings attributed by Moscow to malign sponsorship by external forces-has become a central theme in Russian security discourse. This article analyses how colored revolutions came to be characterized as a specific threat to national security and how they continue to shape Russian thinking about the changing character of conflict. It explores Russian perceptions of the threat from colored revolutions, using the concept of strategic culture as a framework to analyze these perceptions through an analysis of the Russian military theoretical literature and strategic documents. The article establishes that concerns about non-military means of destabilization reflect continuities in Russian strategic assumptions about adversaries and how they seek to achieve their national objectives. It also reveals the perpetuation of specific narratives about the country's vulnerability to foreign interference.

Russian Strategic Culture in Retrospect

“…* * * In 1946, when bidding his final farewell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kuznetsky Bridge, former People's Commissar Litvinov, who openly resented Stalin and no longer cared much about his own future, scandalously told U.S. journalist Richard C. Hottelet that the Soviet leadership preached an "obsolete security concept" based on the imperative of expanding its territorial control, which in the future could lead to a direct clash with the United States and its allies (Zubok, 2011, p. 55). Today, both in Russia and in the West, one can hear similar statements, accompanied by the constantly repeated mantra about Russia's internal weakness as the source of its "aggressiveness" (Baunov, 2020;German, 2020). However, both Litvinov (primarily when he was a people's commissar in the interwar years) and contemporary observers overlook the fact that Russian strategic culture, fostered in the 20th century, tends to absorb as much as possible the "paradoxical logic" of strategy (Luttwak, 2012, pp.…”

Strategic Culture and the Russian Federation’s Engagement in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

“…Izkušnje iz obdobja SZ -kot produkta revolucije in državljanske vojne -so izoblikovale strah pred protirevolucijo, notranjim prevratom ter kakršno koli zaznano grožnjo, ki bi utegnila ogroziti stabilnost režima (German, 2020, Povod, s katerim se je začel rusko-ukrajinski konflikt, predstavlja izbruh protestov na majdanškem trgu v Kijevu novembra 2013 zaradi odločitve tedanjega, zadnjega proruskega predsednika Janukoviča o neratifikaciji sporazuma o sodelovanju (angl. Association Agreement) z EU.…”

“…Na oblikovanje sodobne strateške kulture RF vplivajo njen geografski položaj in zgodovinske izkušnje, ki so jih različne ruske družbenopolitične tvorbe -strateške skupnosti pridobile v večstoletni zgodovini. Kljub dejstvu, da je Rusija v 20. stoletju zamenjala kar tri oblike političnih sistemov, številni avtorji (Covington, 2016;Skak, 2016;Felgenhauer, 2018;German, 2020), z izjemo kratkega obdobja v devetdesetih, prepoznavajo vzorec kontinuitete med sodobno strateško kulturo RF ter sovjetsko. Strateška skupnost RF namreč vključuje posameznike, ki so bodisi bili del sovjetske strateške skupnosti ali pa so v SZ izobraženi in usposobljeni.…”

Suriye Krizi Bağlamında Rusya'nın Suriye Politikası

“…Ukrayna'da yaşanan gelişmelerden dolayı, ABD ve AB ülkelerinin Rusya'ya ekonomik yaptırım uygulamaya başlamasına ek olarak o dönemde düşen petrol fiyatları, Rus ekonomisini oldukça olumsuz etkilemiştir. Batı tarafından uygulanan tüm yaptırımlara rağmen Rusya, Ukrayna'da istediğini elde etmiş, eski Sovyet coğrafyasındaki nüfuzunu korumak adına gerekirse askeri müdahale seçeneğini kullanabileceğini tüm dünyaya göstermiştir (Erşen, 2019;German, 2020).…”