When it comes to linkages between migration and the global allocation of foreign development assistance, the size of the immigrant population from a recipient country residing in a donor country is an important determinant of dyadic aid commitments. Two complementary hypotheses probe this relationship. First, donors use foreign aid to achieve their broader immigration goals, targeting migrant-sending areas to increase development and decrease the demand for entry into the donor country. Second, migrants already residing in the donor country mobilize to lobby for additional aid for their homeland. Empirical tests on a large sample of country pairs made up of twenty-two donors and more than 150 recipients over the period 1993 to 2008 show robust support for these hypotheses.Immigration, particularly of low-skilled workers, has generated political conflict in many industrialized countries. Anti-immigrant parties have gained strength in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland, whereas riots linked to immigration have occurred in Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. Because of this increase in social conflict, politicians across developed democracies-a key destination for the world's migrants-have produced a wide array of policies to limit migration. These policies, including increasing border security, mandating language proficiency, and elevating minimum skills requirements, have done little to decrease the demand for entry into the world's industrial democracies. These same destination countries spend more than $1 billion annually on official development assistance. 1 Given this overlap, it is important to ask whether migration preferences influence foreign aid policy in donor states.Donor migration preferences are not the only reason to expect a link between foreign aid and migration. Migrant communities often play a role in influencing the foreign policy choices of their host government, including their allocation of development assistance. Migrants have the ability to lobby host country governments, and a particular incentive to do so when policy relates to their country of origin. Powerful ethnic lobbies, such as those associated with Armenia, India, and Israel, have been successful in pressing the US Congress on policies toward their homelands. 2