He/She/They/Ze

Dembroff, Robin; Wodak, Daniel

doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.014

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“…We remain neutral on this debate, as we do not think any proposed semantics will escape the worries we here raise for gender-specific terms. For further reading on the semantics of gender terms, seeBettcher (2013),Saul (2012), andDiaz-Leon (2016).8 SeeDembroff & Wodak (2018). Again, we remain neutral here as to whether gender is best understood in terms of identity, biology, social position, or something else.…”

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How Much Gender Is Too Much Gender?

Dembroff¹,

Wodak²

2021

The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language

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Languages form a spectrum from having fewer to more gender-specific terms. On one end of the spectrum we have languages like Hebrew. As Ilana Masad explained in an article on The Toast, in Hebrew "one cannot speak in the first-or second-person without indicating gender. The word 'I' is ungendered, but any verb connected to it in present or future tenses is gendered. Thus the phrase, "I want a cookie" becomes, in literal translation, "I female-want a female-cookie"." 1 On the other end of the spectrum, we have languages like Finnish, which does not have grammatical gender or any gender-specific pronouns.Somewhere between Finnish and Hebrew, we find English. 2 Certain parts of speech in English are gender-specific-for instance, singular third-person pronouns (he and she). This makes English more gendered than languages like Finnish. But first-and second-person pronouns (I and you), and the verbs connected to them, are gender-neutral in English, which makes English less gendered than languages like Hebrew.

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confidence: 99%

How Much Gender Is Too Much Gender?

Dembroff¹,

Wodak²

2021

The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language

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“…What we say about this general issue should guide what we say about the special case in which these beliefs lead someone to consent. 2 Here and throughout, I will use "they" as a singular gender-neutral pronoun largely for the reasons given in (Dembroff & Wodak 2018). Specifically, consent releases someone from a "directed duty" or a "bipolar obligation" (Sidgwick, 1893;Thompson, 2004;Darwall, 2006;Sreenivasan, 2010).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…22Here and throughout, I will use “they” as a singular gender‐neutral pronoun largely for the reasons given in (Dembroff & Wodak 2018). Specifically, consent releases someone from a “directed duty” or a “bipolar obligation” (Sidgwick, 1893; Thompson, 2004; Darwall, 2006; Sreenivasan, 2010).…”

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Why does duress undermine consent?¹

Dougherty

2019

Nous

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In this essay, I discuss why consent is invalidated by duress that involves attaching penalties to someone's refusal to give consent. At the heart of my explanation is the Complaint Principle. This principle specifies that consent is defeasibly invalid when the consent results from someone conditionally imposing a penalty on the consent-giver's refusal to give the consent, such that the consent-giver has a legitimate complaint against this imposition focused on how it is affects their incentives for consenting. The Complaint Principle says that this consent is defeasibly invalid to make room for the Authorization Principle, which allows sincere authorizations to constitute valid consent, even when these are issued by an agent acting under duress.The Authorization Principle has application only in cases of third-party duress because when the consent-receiver is the source of the duress, the consent-giver is not sincerely authorizing the action.

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“…manifests existential reenforcement of the dominant assumption that men ought to behave in stereotypically masculine ways. In contrast, someone who considers themself a woman 56 See Dembroff & Wodak (2018) for further argument on this point. 57 Thanks to Alicia Fowler for alerting me to the possibility of religiously motivated resistance to the binary assumption.…”

Section: A New Approach: Critical Gender Kindsmentioning

confidence: 99%

References

2020

The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy

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We want to know what gender is. But metaphysical approaches to this question solely have focused on the binary gender kinds men and women. By overlooking those who identify outside of the binary-the group I call 'genderqueer'-we are left without tools for understanding these new and quickly growing gender identifications. This metaphysical gap in turn creates a conceptual lacuna that contributes to systematic misunderstanding of genderqueer persons. In this paper, I argue that to better understand genderqueer identities, we must recognize a new type of gender kind: critical gender kinds, or kinds whose members collectively resist dominant gender ideology. After developing a model of critical gender kinds, I suggest that genderqueer is best modeled as a critical gender kind that stands in opposition to 'the binary assumption', or the prevalent assumption that the only possible genders are the binary, discrete, exclusive, and exhaustive kinds men and women.

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He/She/They/Ze

Cited by 24 publications

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How Much Gender Is Too Much Gender?

How Much Gender Is Too Much Gender?

Why does duress undermine consent?¹

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He/She/They/Ze

Cited by 24 publications

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How Much Gender Is Too Much Gender?

How Much Gender Is Too Much Gender?

Why does duress undermine consent?1

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Why does duress undermine consent?¹