According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent's cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjusti ably anthropocentric focus, for it depicts cognitive extensions as a human-only a air. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we will proceed as follows. First ( §1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including "intrabodily" cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord ( §2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks ( §3) and cases of animal cognitive o oading ( §4). We'll then allay some worries our claim might raise ( §5) to then conclude the paper ( §6).