2014
DOI: 10.1093/cje/beu049
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Heads I win, tails you lose? A career analysis of executive pay and corporate performance

Abstract: The paper adopts a novel career perspective to examine theories of corporate control in the context of executive pay. Detailed career histories of boardroom executives in all FTSE350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are utilised. The paper highlights the failure of existing arrangements to adjust pay outcomes where career performance is poor. The leading theoretical reasons for this disconnect, namely managerial power and neo-institutionalism, are not consistent with the data. The paper identifies a settling-up… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
7
0

Year Published

2014
2014
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
5

Relationship

3
2

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 10 publications
(7 citation statements)
references
References 105 publications
(126 reference statements)
0
7
0
Order By: Relevance
“…This is total direct compensation as realised (TDCr) which adds to ‘TCC’ the observed realised value of long term incentives such as executive share options and performance share plans. This obviates the need to estimate the expected value of awarded incentives, and simply records their actual value at vesting when they can be cashed in (GregorySmith and Main, ).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This is total direct compensation as realised (TDCr) which adds to ‘TCC’ the observed realised value of long term incentives such as executive share options and performance share plans. This obviates the need to estimate the expected value of awarded incentives, and simply records their actual value at vesting when they can be cashed in (GregorySmith and Main, ).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conyon and Murphy (2000) valued performance share plans at 80% of face value. and simply records their actual value at vesting when they can be cashed in (Gregory-Smith and Main, 2013).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our data consist of the sample of UK listed companies in the FTSE All-Share Index between 1996 and 2010 as held by Manifest Information Services Ltd. 3 The Manifest data record the date of appointment of each director to the board and the date of resignation or departure from the board (as filed with Companies House). Additional detail on the personal characteristics of the directors and of the companies involved is also available through Manifest (Gregory-Smith and Main, 2015). Further company-specific data are derived from DataStream.…”
Section: Samplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a subsequent paper, Ozkan (2011) confirms this finding, showing that a higher proportion of independent directors is associated with higher total executive compensation in poorly performing firms, while nevertheless revealing a positive relationship between independent directors and pay‐for‐performance. Finally, Gregory‐Smith and Main (2015) show this positive association discussion in terms of a legitimacy effect imparted by the presence of non‐executive directors.…”
Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 91%