2016
DOI: 10.1093/heapol/czw091
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Health system changes under pay-for-performance: the effects of Rwanda’s national programme on facility inputs

Abstract: Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes have been introduced in numerous developing countries with the goal of increasing the provision and quality of health services through financial incentives. Despite the popularity of P4P, there is limited evidence on how providers achieve performance gains and how P4P affects health system quality by changing structural inputs. We explore these two questions in the context of Rwanda's 2006 national P4P programme by examining the programme's impact on structural quality meas… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1
1

Citation Types

1
15
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
10

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 20 publications
(16 citation statements)
references
References 41 publications
1
15
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Measuring the necessary inputs to care provided limited insight on the process quality of care delivered in primary care services as well as in more resource-intensive delivery care. These findings amplify a study of pay-for-performance interventions in Rwanda, demonstrating that increased availability of inputs for delivery care explained an insignificant fraction of increased delivery volume [ 45 ]. Although we would not expect perfect correlation due to the breadth of the infrastructure measures relative to the specific items of evidence-based care, the limited associations and high variability in observed clinical quality at similar levels of facility infrastructure was striking, even for well-equipped facilities.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 74%
“…Measuring the necessary inputs to care provided limited insight on the process quality of care delivered in primary care services as well as in more resource-intensive delivery care. These findings amplify a study of pay-for-performance interventions in Rwanda, demonstrating that increased availability of inputs for delivery care explained an insignificant fraction of increased delivery volume [ 45 ]. Although we would not expect perfect correlation due to the breadth of the infrastructure measures relative to the specific items of evidence-based care, the limited associations and high variability in observed clinical quality at similar levels of facility infrastructure was striking, even for well-equipped facilities.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 74%
“…The improved work environment and health worker performance combined with the increased number of patients increases the health facility budget, which can trigger further improvements in the work environment (KIs 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11–14), closing the reinforcing feedback loop. An important influencing factor of this loop is the ability of the management team to plan well and to use the newly received funds in an efficient and effective way (KI 2) [ 51 , 55 , 56 ].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, in 2004, the government of Burundi institutionalized output-based financial support or performance-based financing (PBF) of the facilities [ 22 ]. Performance-based financing has shown to be a promising reform approach to improving the utilization, the quantity and quality of maternal and child health services in Burundi and in neighboring countries such as Rwanda [ 3 , 10 , 47 , 48 ]. Other effective intervention programs for the management of childhood diarrhea have been those to do with the “social marketing intervention that promoted the Population Services International (PSI) ORASEL Kit, a low osmolarity oral rehydration salt (ORS), a product developed by FDC limited ( ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%