Hedge Fund Activism Across 25 Countries: An Empirical Analysis

Katelouzou, Dionysia

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1801226

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…The Member States remain free to adopt further thresholds, including lower ones, such as a 3 percent threshold in the UK or a 2 percent threshold in Italy. 137 Reducing the flagging thresholds and tightening the deadlines for flagging enables 'an activist attack' to be detected as early as possible. 138 Shareholders can also be required to vote in their own name, not anonymously through proxy advisors.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These are just a few examples. 141 These methods do not prevent shareholder activism, but make it less attractive. They are, however, not very popular in the present regulatory atmosphere.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…65 Not all institutional investors nor their activism are, however, similar. Shareholder activism is a more recent phenomenon in Europe than in the US, 66 and European regulation of pension funds and companies is also more tolerant of ESG investing than the US equivalent. For example, Norwegian domestic institutional investors have long been interested in activism, 67 and investor engagement in Sweden, due to shareholder friendly corporate governance, has in recent years led to both domestic activism and foreign activism towards management.…”

Section: Age Of Activism: the Voyage Across The Atlanticmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shareholder Activism

Mähönen¹

2022

Sustainable Value Creation in the European Union

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2 By 'institutional investors', I mean institutions investing others' savings on their behalf ('money managers'). Typical institutional investors are public and private pension funds and companies, insurance companies and other joint investment properties such as civil law foundations and sovereign wealth funds, as well as hedge funds. E.B. Rock, 'Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance', in J.N. Gordon and W.-G. Ringe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Age Of Activism: the Voyage Across The Atlanticmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shareholder Activism

Mähönen¹

2022

Sustainable Value Creation in the European Union

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“…160 It may be argued that it is not only investor holdings/interests and identities that may be price-sensitive information in the marketplace, but, as investors are asked and expected to engage with companies, 161 engagement agendas and behaviour may also become important signals in the marketplace for other investors. 162 In the US, institutions that acquire 5% or more of a publicly traded company's equity as beneficial owners must disclose the stake and the purpose of the investment. 163 In the EU, the Transparency Directive is silent on the issue of intentions-related disclosure, but some EU Member States, including France and Germany, impose additional disclosure obligations for large investors in relation to the objectives pursued by their investment.…”

Section: A Case For Governing Institutions' Shareholder Roles In Secumentioning

confidence: 99%

Making a Case for Regulating Institutional Shareholders' Corporate Governance Roles

Chiu

Katelouzou

2017

SSRN Journal

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Drawing on the disconnect that currently exists between the social expectations associated with the corporate governance role of institutions and the institutions' private interests, this article suggests that the current English legal framework does not adequately promote an optimal corporate governance role for institutions and does not meet the public interest of safeguarding investors' long-term saving needs and sustaining a sound wealth-creating corporate sector in the long term. Our starting point is that investor-led governance, as this is aspired by UK policy-makers, is not only a matter of achieving beneficiaries' private investment objectives through maximising long-term shareholder-value, but a matter of public interest. Next, we argue that existing regimes of private law that govern this areafirst, the fabric of largely private law in contract and trust that governs the investment funds' relationships with their beneficiaries, and, secondly, the company law and corporate governance norms that govern investment funds' shareholder roledo not adequately take into account the public interest and, increasingly, are unable to meet the needs of private interests too. These inadequacies have only led to reinforcing a governance deficit for institutional shareholder behaviour and have left the dubious quality of institutions' behaviour to market forces. We suggest that institutions' shareholder behaviour should be governed in securities and investment management regulation and we outline the broad contours of how this may be achieved.

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What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tell Us About Proxy Access

Sharfman¹

2018

SSRN Journal

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Hedge Fund Activism Across 25 Countries: An Empirical Analysis

Cited by 3 publications

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Shareholder Activism

Shareholder Activism

Making a Case for Regulating Institutional Shareholders' Corporate Governance Roles

What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tell Us About Proxy Access

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