Hedged Assertion

Abstract

<p>Surprisingly little has been written about hedged assertion. Linguists often focus on semantic or syntactic theorizing about, for example, grammatical evidentials or epistemic modals, but they pay far less attention to what hedging does at the level of action. By contrast, philosophers have focused extensively on normative issues regarding what epistemic position is required for proper assertion, yet they have almost exclusively considered unqualified declaratives. This article considers the linguistic and normative issues side by side. It aims to bring some order and clarity to thinking about hedging, so as to illuminate aspects of interest to both linguists and philosophers. In particular, it considers three broad questions. (1) The structural question: when one hedges, what is the speaker’s commitment weakened from? (2) The functional question: what is the best way to understand how a hedge weakens? And (3) the taxonomic question: are hedged assertions genuine assertions, another speech act, or what?</p>

Deceiving without answering

“…But it is plausibly not an assertion because it is neither a proposal to update the common ground nor extendible into a discourse that is absurd. For more on hedged assertion, see Benton and van Elswyk (2018).…”

P, but you don’t know that P

“…Goldberg (2015) argues that the default knowledge norm doesn't apply in conditions of diminished epistemic hope, and Fleisher (2021) argues that assertion in the realm of certain research projects parallel norms for endorsement rather than belief. Benton and van Elswyk (2020) argue compellingly that we can weaken the obligation to follow a strong norm of assertion by hedging. It's consistent with all this that there is a default norm of assertion that applies unless there is some special explanation for why it does not in a given case or domain.…”

“…Footnote 30 continued Benton (2011Benton ( , 2012Benton ( , 2016, Sosa (2011), Turri (2011, Goldberg (2015), Benton and van Elswyk (2020), and Willard-Kyle (2020).…”

Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion

“… Some theorists argue that there is a default norm of assertion that can, nevertheless, be modified across different contexts, as in ‘conditions of epistemically diminished hope’ (Goldberg, , p. 285) or when Hedged (Benton and Van Elswyk, ). My thesis should be understood as the claim that being in a position to know is the default norm of assertion.…”