Hedged testimony

Abstract

Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm‐based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge merely for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes.

Helping Others to Understand: A Normative Account of the Speech Act of Explanation

“… 5 For flat-out assertions, see Hinchman ( 2020 ); for hedged assertives, see van Elswyk ( 2022 ); for non-at-issue content, see Langton ( 2021 ). …”

“… 16 This view has a long philosophical tradition; classically formulated by Moore ( 1962 ), Slote ( 1979 ) and Unger ( 1975 ); more recently defended by van Elswyk ( 2021 , 2022 ); see McCammon ( 2014 ) for a discussion in relation to KNA. …”