Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry

Abstract

Penultimate Dra , Forthcoming in Synthese What sort of epistemic positions are compatible with inquiries driven by interrogative attitudes like wonder and puzzlement? The ignorance norm provides a partial answer: interrogative attitudes directed at a particular question are never compatible with knowledge of the question's answer. But some are tempted to think that interrogative attitudes are incompatible with weaker positions like belief as well. This paper defends that the ignorance norm is exhaustive. All epistemic positions weaker than knowledge directed at the answer to a question are compatible with having an interrogative attitude towards that question. We offer two arguments for this conclusion. The first is based on considerations about the role of hedging in inquiry. The second is conditional on considerations related to the aim of inquiry as a goal-directed activity.

Guidance and mainstream epistemology

“…Therefore, knowing the answer to a question—since it is incompatible with properly holding these questioning attitudes—is incompatible with properly inquiring. I noted above that she is joined in this conclusion by Kelp ( 2021 ), van Elswyk and Sapir ( 2021 ), Whitcomb ( 2017 ), and Millar ( 2011 ). None of these philosophers are on record as sympathetic to the regulative critique.…”

“…Christoph Kelp ( 2021 , 10), Peter van Elswyk and Yasha Sapir ( 2021 , 5838), Dennis Whitcomb ( 2017 , 152), and Alan Millar ( 2011 , 63), among others, make similar recommendations. These epistemologists argue that inquiry into some question is finished when you know the answer.…”

Questioning and addressee knowledge

“…Hawthorne (2004, p. 24) also endorses such a norm. As a norm of inquiry more generally, the ignorance norm is defended by Friedman (2017) and van Elswyk and Sapir (2021). See Archer (2018) for critical discussion.…”

“…2 Recent work on the norms of inquiry includes: Whitcomb (2017); Friedman (2019bFriedman ( ,a, 2020; Millson (2020); Falbo (2021); Thorstad (2021); McGrath (2021); van Elswyk and Sapir (2021); Woodard (2022).…”

Assertion remains strong

“… See Hawthorne et al (2016),Dorst (2019),Rothschild (2020), van Elswyk andSapir (2021),Holguín (2022), and Dorst and Mandelkern (forthcoming).4 Strictly speaking, Mandelkern and Dorst provide three arguments. But the first just consists of cases where speakers appear to assert blamelessly without knowing what they assert.…”