Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation: Dialectics of Negation and Difference

Shores, Corry

doi:10.1080/00071773.2014.1000092

Cited by 1 publication

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“…These cited Ficara texts also argue that, despite other interpretations to the contrary, Hegel's notions of contradiction and negation should be regarded in formal logic terms. Also, for an extensive, detailed study of contradiction in Hegel, in the context of Deleuze's philosophy, see Somers-Hall (2012).…”

Section: Del Euze's Con T R a Dict Ionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…. to that of contradiction” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 170; see Somers‐Hall, 2022a, p. 212); moreover, Deleuze claims: “what is still missing is the extra‐propositional or sub‐representative element expressed in the Idea by the differential, precisely in the form of a problem” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 178; see Somers‐Hall, 2012, p. 177). According to Somers‐Hall, logic for Deleuze is not a matter of “‘what follows’ from a set of propositions,” but, rather, it “relates instead to determining, in a given situation, ‘which one’ of the implications will be brought to mind” (Somers‐Hall, 2022b, p. 407); in other words, logic for Deleuze, it would seem, has more to do with how the two levels interact in the thinking process, the dynamic of which presumably operating free from the limitations of any formalizable logic.…”

Section: Deleuze and “Alogical” Thinkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dialetheism in Deleuze's event

Shores

2023

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Deleuze never explicitly formulates his philosophy of logical truth‐values. It thus remains an open question as to the number and types he held there to be. Despite his explicit comments on these matters, additional textual evidence suggests that in his thinking on the event, he favored a third truth‐value, holding either the analetheic view that some truth‐bearers can be truth‐valueless or the dialetheic view that some truth‐bearers can be both true and false. I first argue that taking a logical approach to Deleuze's thinking is feasible, despite his and others' claims that might suggest otherwise. Next, I examine his explicit statements to show that they cannot be taken at face value and that, rather, we need to transpose his claims into contemporary terminology in order to accurately assess them. I lastly turn to his Leibniz‐inspired philosophy of time to argue that the affirmations involved in this conception strongly suggest a dialetheic tendency in his thinking.

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Section: Del Euze's Con T R a Dict Ionsmentioning

confidence: 99%