Hegel's metaphysics of nature

Abstract

Hegel often criticizes the use of unobservable entities postulated in scientific theories. For example, he claims that atoms are not things but, rather, thoughts, and that various imponderable stuffs such as caloric are not independently existing things but, rather, "moments" of material bodies. In this paper I argue that, in such passages, Hegel expresses his original metaphysics of nature, which I relate to the different positions on the relation between what Sellars has called the "scientific image" and the "manifest image." I reconstruct those aspects of Hegel's philosophy of inorganic nature that allow us to understand Hegel's position in detail, as well as his reasoning in support of it. I argue that, for Hegel, mechanical properties of bodies are abstractions from the bodies that have a full complement of physical and chemical properties standing in specific relations of dependency. Such bodies correspond to the objects of our manifest image, which thus has priority over the scientific image for Hegel. | INTRODUCTIONHegel's philosophy of nature is one of the least popular and studied parts of Hegel's legacy. Recently, some scholarly attention has turned towards it and the topics related to it, especially to Hegel's account of life, the relationship between his philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit, and the bearing of the Hegelian approach to nature on issues in environmental philosophy. For some decades now, there has also been a steady stream of publications, primarily in German, on specific parts of the philosophy of nature, for example on Hegel's treatment of mechanics and

Brandom on Hegel’s Objective Idealism

“…Hegel observes that explaining even physical phenomena such as "light, magnetism, heat, and electricity" necessitates concepts extending beyond basic "pressure, collision, [and] displacement of parts" (Hegel 2010b: §195A). He argues that higher-order complexities exhibit emergent properties that are irreducible to mere differences in shape and motion (Kabeshkin 2021). Boyle's classic example of a basic lock and its key is illustrative; while each can be described as "a piece of iron contrived into such a shape" (Boyle 1991: 23), a comprehensive explanation based solely on laws of motion fails to elucidate their functional characteristics, such as locking and unlocking.…”

External or Intrinsic Purpose—What comes first? On Hegel's Treatment of Teleology

“…Enc : §246Z, 9: 20; §247Z, 9: 24–25. See recently Kabeshkin (2022b: 778–80) who uses Sellars's distinction to convincingly argue that Hegel defends the ‘manifest image’ against the abstract ontology of scientism. He also points out that Hegel does not reject all metaphysics, but only the wrong kind of metaphysics (2022b: 781).…”

“… 52 We can compare this argumentation to the prior movement from inert matter that ‘gets externally moved’ to the notion of ‘gravity’ as an essential inner aspect of matter, see the instructive interpretation from Kabeshkin (2022b: 781–86).…”

“…28 Following Hegel's quoted parallelization I draw in this summary both from Hegel's remarks in the Philosophy of Nature, and from his more detailed analysis in the Logic. Recently see Kabeshkin (2022b), for an excellent discussion of the logical development in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature concerning Mechanism and Physics, and Kabeshkin (2022a) for a comparison of the discussion of Life in the Logic and the Philosophy of Nature. 29 In the following I will summarize Hegel's complex analysis of 'identity' that differentiates and integrates different notions of 'identity'.…”