Hegemonic preservation or horizontal accountability: constitutional review in Turkey

Abstract

Does constitutional review in emerging democracies tend to enhance horizontal accountability or to preserve state-elite hegemony? The results of a quantitative analysis of abstract constitutional review in Turkey during the 1984-2007 period show: (1) that the Constitutional Court was no more likely to accept unconstitutionality claims by state-elite parties than by non-state-elite parties; and (2) that the Constitutional Court was more likely to accept unconstitutionality claims of executive transgressions than those of stateprinciples violations. In sum, the findings largely point to the Constitutional Court's preference for horizontal accountability over hegemonic preservation.

Justices ‘en Garde’: Ideological determinants of the dissolution of anti-establishment parties

“…Given the judicialization of politics over time, the literature is divided in terms of the democratic legitimacy of non-elected constitutional bodies. Some authors contend that constitutional politics pose a danger to democracy, while others see it as acting as a positive check and balance (Caldeira, 1987; Hazama, 2012; Hirschl, 2004). Indeed, to the extent that judicial activism reaches certain levels, the legitimacy of such courts is a serious concern.…”

“…Previous empirical studies on the CCT scrutinized the political divide between old and new elites by examining the decisions of the Court in judicial review cases (Belge, 2006; Hazama, 2012). Unlike those studies, which examine case-level variation in the exercise of judicial review cases, the present article is the first to examine justice-level variation.…”

“…In the literature, party dissolution decisions are considered to be a “reaction” of the regime against anti-establishment ideologies (Algan, 2011: 809). Further, some scholars suggest that the Turkish political regime has come close to a government of judges due to the Court’s expansionist approach (Hazama, 2012; Özbudun, 2007; Shambayati and Kirdis, 2009; Tezcur, 2009). Examining the role of justice ideology in decision-making, hence, is crucial, as “explanations of politics are incomplete, unless they incorporate courts” (Epstein et al, 2001: 120), especially if the Courts are unconstrained but constraining actors.…”

Judicialization of Politics by Elected Politicians

“…That being said, this is not a very strong veto power because if the Parliament enacts the same law without amendment, then the president must promulgate it. Since the unicameral Parliamentary system in Turkey allows the incumbent political party to dominate the executive and legislative branches, constitutional review remains the only veto point available to opposition parties in the Turkish Parliament (Hazama 2012).…”

“…If this is the case, then the court should favor the state elite opposition parties over non-state elite opposition parties. 7 However, in his empirical analysis of the TCC decisions, Hazama (2012, 435) shows that the court does not respond differently to unconstitutionality claims by the state elite and non-state elite opposition parties. In other words, the probability of the court’s decision to nullify the objection is not significantly affected by an opposition party’s state elite versus non-state elite status.…”