2019
DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2019.1604981
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Hegemony Studies 3.0: The Dynamics of Hegemonic Orders

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Cited by 95 publications
(44 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, we need to be careful when we talk about “the liberal international order.” It is certainly possible to think in terms of an overarching “order of orders” that encompasses all of global politics. But, in practice, most of the discussion of “international liberal order” (and, indeed, “international order” more broadly) refers to more limited and specific patterns of relations and practices (Goddard, 2018; Ikenberry and Nexon, 2019; Koivisto and Dunne, 2010; Sorensen, 2011). For example, we see significant variation in international ordering across regions and between policy spaces.…”
Section: Liberal International Ordermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, we need to be careful when we talk about “the liberal international order.” It is certainly possible to think in terms of an overarching “order of orders” that encompasses all of global politics. But, in practice, most of the discussion of “international liberal order” (and, indeed, “international order” more broadly) refers to more limited and specific patterns of relations and practices (Goddard, 2018; Ikenberry and Nexon, 2019; Koivisto and Dunne, 2010; Sorensen, 2011). For example, we see significant variation in international ordering across regions and between policy spaces.…”
Section: Liberal International Ordermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When the hegemon is in decline, the rising power attempts to change the international system in its favor. Therefore, the rising power faces direct conflict with the hegemon, ultimately leading to a hegemonic war (Gilpin 1981; for an overview of the hegemonic stability theory, its developments and criticism see Ikenberry and Nexon 2019).…”
Section: Trump's "Maximum Pressure" Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, an international order is never neutral, nor is it necessarily an entirely voluntary exercise on the part of all its members: a certain amount of co-optation and coercion, at times perhaps even domination is to be expected. The stance taken here is that when it comes to the question of order in international politics, norms, practices and institutions should be viewed as sites of contestation and struggle: in the final analysis, it is their content that reflects both the power and the ideas of those who are able to affect change in them (Wiener 2014 ; see also Ikenberry and Nexon 2019 ; Wivel and Paul 2019 ). In this reading, a choice between power and ideas is a false dichotomy: It is not either ideas or power but both that will be required to make sense of any given international order (Sørensen 2008 ).…”
Section: Power Order and (Non)polaritymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Firstly, it links European studies with IR debates concerning polarity and the ongoing change in the structure of international politics. It situates itself in the so-called third wave of hegemony studies (Ikenberry and Nexon 2019 ), but concentrates on examining the unravelling of western hegemony in Europe. Secondly, it seeks to conceptually expand our understanding of Great Powerhood by introducing the notion of ‘ordering agents’.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%