“…2 We point to the phenomena at hand, whose meaning may seem self-evident, and to possible directions of interpretation, but in such a way that we at the same time acknowledge that we do not really know what we are actually saying when we use words such as "thing", "thinking", "being" or truth", and that we should allow ourselves to be summoned by these words, that we should be prepared to travel the difficult path towards them. Heidegger developed his notion of formal indication in the context of his Auseinandersetzung with Husserl (Hadjioannou 2019;Wendland et al 2019) and the term "formal" (used in the context of his discussion of Husserl's concept of formalisation) actually means something like "provisional". Heidegger refrains from re-using this term in later texts, but the attitude as such remains very much alive, not only in Being and Time (Dahlstrom 1994, Streeter 1997, Shockey 2010), but also in later writings.…”