Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?

Borzyskowski, Inken von; Vabulas, Felicity

doi:10.1007/s11558-019-09352-2

Cited by 96 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…This is particularly the case for organizations acting as focal points for global governance (Jupille et al 2013 ). Recent evidence on withdrawals from or deaths of international organizations reveal that these events occur primarily for regional, specialized or defunct organizations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018 ; von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019 ). For example, exits from the World Tourism Organization, the International Whaling Commission and the UN Industrial Development Organization account for nearly a quarter of all withdrawals from international organizations in the post-war period (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019 ).…”

Section: Discursive Legitimation In World Politics: the Unga As A Strmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent evidence on withdrawals from or deaths of international organizations reveal that these events occur primarily for regional, specialized or defunct organizations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018 ; von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019 ). For example, exits from the World Tourism Organization, the International Whaling Commission and the UN Industrial Development Organization account for nearly a quarter of all withdrawals from international organizations in the post-war period (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019 ). In contrast, a closer look at withdrawals from the GATT/WTO, IMF and the World Bank reveals only nine instances, all occurring in the 1950s or 1960s, mostly by socialist countries (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019 ).…”

Section: Discursive Legitimation In World Politics: the Unga As A Strmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The liberal international order has been remarkably resilient, with relatively limited cases of states exiting organizations or abandoning treaties (Bromley and Meyer 2015;Shanks et al 1996;von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019). This is particularly the case for organizations acting as focal points for global governance (Jupille et al 2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Legitimacy challenges to the liberal world order: Evidence from United Nations speeches, 1970–2018

Kentikelenis

Voeten

2020

Rev Int Organ

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The liberal international economic order has been facing high-profile legitimacy challenges in recent years. This article puts these challenges in historical context through a systematic analysis of rhetorical challenges towards both the order per se and specific global economic institutions. Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s classic typology of exit, voice and loyalty, we coded leaders’ speeches in the General Debate at the UN General Assembly between 1970 and 2018 as articulating intentions to abandon elements of the order, challenges or calls for reform, unequivocal support, or factual mentions of cooperation. Surprisingly, we find that explicit criticisms towards the liberal order are at an all-time low and that exit threats remain rare. An analysis of the historical evolution of criticisms to global economic institutions reveals a move away from the Cold War insider-outsider conflict towards insider contestation. For example, we find that as countries’ economies become more open, their leaders expressed more support for global economic institutions during the Cold War but less support since. Finally, we demonstrate consistency between the public policy positions leaders announce in UNGA General Debate speeches and their government positions on consequential reform debates on debt relief.

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Section: Discursive Legitimation In World Politics: the Unga As A Strmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discursive Legitimation In World Politics: the Unga As A Strmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Legitimacy challenges to the liberal world order: Evidence from United Nations speeches, 1970–2018

Kentikelenis

Voeten

2020

Rev Int Organ

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“…With regard to institutional adjustments to global power shifts more specifically, challengers to the institutional status quowhether emerging or established powers issue threats to undermine the institution in question to try to force defenders of the status quo to accept their demands (Zangl et al, 2016). For that purpose, they may threaten to violate the institution's norms (non-compliance), to delay or block its decisions (sabotage), to resign from the organization (resignation; see von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019), to withdraw institutional support (disengagement) or to create competing institutions (counter-institutionalization). They may also build coalitions with other dissatisfied members of the institution to enhance their ability to undermine it and thus force defenders to agree to the desired adjustments.…”

Section: Power Bargaining: Forcing Defendersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Adjustment of International Institutions to Global Power Shifts: A Framework for Analysis

Kruck

Zangl

2020

Global Policy

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As powers such as China and India rise, and powers such as the US and the UK decline, international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund come under pressure to adapt to new power realities. In the wake of global power shifts, both emerging and established powers may challenge the institutional status quo. Contrary to what most power transition and power shift theories assume, challengers do not always draw on power bargaining to pursue institutional adjustment. In some issue areas, they do, but in others they employ alternative strategies including strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion and principled persuasion. In order to contribute to a better understanding of institutional adjustments to global power shifts, the introduction to this special issue theorizes these various strategies. First, we conceptualize power bargaining, strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion and principled persuasion as distinct strategies for institutional adjustment. Second, we elaborate on the conditions under which challengers choose particular strategies. Third, we specify the conditions under which challengers are able to achieve institutional adaptation through a particular strategy. Finally, we discuss broader implications for the future of the international order and the management of global power shifts. Policy Implications • Efforts to manage global power shifts should not focus exclusively on challenges from rising powers but must take into account challenges from declining powers too. Not only China is challenging the current international order, but in some issue areas the US is acting as a challenger too. To manage global power shifts both challenges from rising and declining powers have to be taken seriously. • In the wake of global power shifts, challengers of the institutional status quo need not always rely on power bargaining. Sometimes strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion or principled persuasion are not only better suited to attain institutional adjustment; they are also less conflictive. They thus allow maintaining (or creating) cooperative relations between emerging and established powers, which will often be in the interest of challengers. • In the wake of global power shifts, defenders of the institutional status quo should not assume that challengers will engage in power bargaining. After all, policy responses that are adequate for addressing power bargaining are often counterproductive in dealing with strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion or principled persuasion. As the latter are less conflictive, they allow maintaining (or creating) cooperative relations between emerging and established powers, which will often be in the interest of defenders. • The conditions of institutional adjustment differ from issue area to issue area and even from institution to institution. Policy advice on how to manage global power shifts should not brush over these differences. Chinese challenges to the global human rights regime c...

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“…Disadvantaged parties may have short run incentives to depart from the agreed‐upon institution but are restrained by its long run benefits. However, if a state’s power increases so that it could achieve more over the long run by reopening bargaining, then a state may depart from the FIGO (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019b) or attempt to change or replace it (Lipscy, 2017).…”

Section: On Institutional Equilibria and Stabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Informal IGOs as Mediators of Power Shifts

Vabulas

Snidal

2020

Global Policy

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In an era defined by shifting distributions of power, states are not only pushing for change in formal international organizations, they are increasingly using informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) to mediate change. Why and how do states use IIGOsinstitutions without a treaty or secretariatto manage global power shifts? IIGOs are useful for states on both sides of the power shift. Established powers use IIGOs for system management through 'collaboration' and strengthening the 'hegemonic consensus' to preserve their institutional privileges while adapting to changing power realities. Rising powers use IIGOs to redistribute through 'power bargaining' and 'rhetorical coercion' to strengthen their institutional roles without overly disrupting the current order. Established and rising powers also work together to use IIGOs for integrative strategies including 'cooptation' and 'principled persuasion', creating a mutually beneficial solution that accommodates both increased demands but also mounting responsibilities. IIGOs help states manage power transitions by providing flexible institutional arrangements that facilitate bargaining without freezing outcomes in permanent institutions while the power distribution evolves. We provide case vignettes of the G7 (system management) in the early phase of a power shift, BRICS (redistributive strategies) in the middle phase, and the G20 (integrative strategies) in the later phase. Policy Implications • Policy makers should use informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) to mediate power shifts because their flexibility and informality provide a forum for gradual adaptation before long run solutions are known. • Legacy powers seeking to maintain status quo institutional arrangements should use IIGOs to build a consensus and collaborate with like-minded partners. • Rising powers seeking to strengthen their institutional positions without overly disrupting prevailing cooperative arrangements should use IIGOs to facilitate bargaining and rhetorical tactics.

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Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?

Cited by 96 publications

References 70 publications

Legitimacy challenges to the liberal world order: Evidence from United Nations speeches, 1970–2018

Legitimacy challenges to the liberal world order: Evidence from United Nations speeches, 1970–2018

The Adjustment of International Institutions to Global Power Shifts: A Framework for Analysis

Informal IGOs as Mediators of Power Shifts

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