Hempel’s logic of confirmation

Huber, Franz

doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9111-2

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Here we see a major difference to Bayesian measures of evidential support. A reason could be that corroboration is also supposed our judgments of acceptance, where it is often required that good theories be informative (see the discussions in Hempel 1960;Levi 1963;Huber 2005Huber , 2008. Indeed, Popper confirms that scientific theory assessment pursues both goals at once:…”

Section: Popper's Measure Of Degree Of Corroborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration

Sprenger

2018

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Popper's Measure Of Degree Of Corroborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration

Sprenger

2018

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Hempel's satisfaction criterion of confirmation implies that E confirms H. Clearly, though, Pr(H | E) is low (not high) and thus is less than t. See Carnap (1962, sec. 87) and Huber (2008) for discussion of how to understand Hempel on confirmation. that E confirms H*, since Pr(H* | E) = 1 > 1/2 = Pr(H*), and H* is entailed by H, but E does not confirm H, since Pr(H | E) = 0 < 1/4 = Pr(H). So CCC is false.…”

Section: Incremental Confirmation: For Any Propositions E and H E Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explanation, Confirmation, and Hempel’s Paradox

Roche¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Hempel’s Converse Consequence Condition (CCC), Entailment Condition (EC), and Special Consequence Condition (SCC) have some prima facie plausibility when taken individually. Hempel, though, shows that they have no plausibility when taken together, for together they entail that E confirms H for any propositions E and H. This is “Hempel’s paradox.” It turns out that Hempel’s argument would fail if one or more of CCC, EC, and SCC were modified in terms of explanation. This opens up the possibility that Hempel’s paradox can be solved by modifying one or more of CCC, EC, and SCC in terms of explanation. This chapter explores this possibility by modifying CCC and SCC in terms of explanation and considering whether CCC and SCC so modified are correct. It also relates that possibility to Inference to the Best Explanation.

show abstract

“…We want to illustrate this point with a simple 12 See Levi (1967;1980) for an implementation of this idea. 13 See Huber (2008aHuber ( , 2008b 14 This is a special case of multiple-premise closure, where the two premises are irrelevant to each other and the conclusion is the conjunction of the premises. 15 Unless, of course, we demand Cartesian certainty for justification by setting the threshold t of the Lockean model at 1.…”

Section: Science Does Not Aim Primarily At High Probabilities It Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

Moretti

Shogenji

2017

Int J Study Skept

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.

show abstract

Hempel’s logic of confirmation

Cited by 11 publications

References 13 publications

Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration

Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration

Explanation, Confirmation, and Hempel’s Paradox

Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About