Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: An integrative developmental theory

Abstract

a b s t r a c tThis article presents a developmental dual-process theory of the understanding of conditionals that integrates Evans' heuristic-analytic theory within the revised mental model theory of conditional proposed by Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas (2008). According to this theory, the interpretation of a conditional sentence is driven by unconscious and implicit heuristic processes that provide individuals with an initial representation that captures its meaning by representing the cases that make it true. This initial model can be enriched with additional models (a process named fleshing out within the mental model theory) through the intervention of conscious and demanding analytic processes. Being optional, these processes construct representations of cases that are only compatible with the conditional, leaving its truth-value indeterminate when they occur. Because heuristic processes are relatively immune to developmental changes, while analytic processes strongly develop with age, the initial model remains stable through development whereas the number of additional models that can be constructed increases steadily. Thus, the dual-process mental model theory predicts in which cases conditionals will be deemed true, indeterminate, or false and how these cases evolve with age. These predictions were verified in children, adolescents and adults who were asked to evaluate the truth value and the probability of several types of conditionals. The results reveal a variety of developmental trajectories in the way different conditionals are interpreted, which can all be accounted for by our revised mental model theory.

Chronometric evidence for the dual-process mental model theory of conditional

“…In our theory, p cases are deemed irrelevant for the truth value of the conditional even when explicitly represented through fleshing out; it is precisely the fleshing out process that makes these cases irrelevant for judging the truth value of the sentence. Our account fits with data indicating that indeterminate responses become more frequent with development (Gauffroy & Barrouillet, 2009) as well as in high-capacity individuals (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2007), because higher cognitive capacity makes possible the fleshing out process which leads in turn to indeterminate responses. Finally, possibilities that are not represented in any model, even when the fleshing out is completed, would be considered as incompatible with the conditional and as falsifying it.…”

“…In summary, a developmental pattern should emerge in truth-table tasks from a conjunctive to a defective biconditional, and finally a defective conditional pattern (Table 1). This is exactly what we observed in several studies (Barrouillet et al, 2008;Gauffroy & Barrouillet, 2009 revealing that the number of responses of irrelevance to p cases evolves in a definite and predictable way with the age-related increase in the number of models constructed, the ''irrelevant'' response to p q being accessible through the construction of a twomodel representation, whereas the ''irrelevant'' response to p q requires a three-model representation that is only accessible later in development.…”

“…Second, we used the response option ''one cannot know'' in all our previous developmental studies because ''irrelevant'' has no direct translation in French and children are not familiar with the French word for ''indeterminate'' (i.e., indéterminé). Finally, using this response option leads to a rate of defective conditional responses in adults that do not differ from what is usually reported in the literature (Barrouillet et al, 2008;Gauffroy & Barrouillet, 2009 order of the test trials was randomised across participants. Response times were recorded.…”

“…We have recently proposed to combine the mental model theory and Evans ' (2006) heuristicanalytic approach within an integrative developmental theory that specifies both the role of heuristic and analytic processes in the construction of mental models for conditionals and the epistemic status of each mental model constructed (Barrouillet, 2011;Barrouillet, Gauffroy, & Lecas, 2008;Gauffroy & Barrouillet, 2009. According to Gauffroy and Barrouillet (2009), the distinction between heuristic and analytic processes can be applied to the construction of mental models for conditionals.…”

“…According to Gauffroy and Barrouillet (2009), the distinction between heuristic and analytic processes can be applied to the construction of mental models for conditionals. The initial model, that comes easily to mind when understanding a conditional, and in which some part of the information is left implicit, seems to be the product of heuristic processes.…”