2000
DOI: 10.1080/00016990050156701
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Heuristics as Plausible Models of Rationality?

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Cited by 3 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Reich (2000), reviewing the work of German social theorist Gerd Gigerenzer, argues that ''yrules for decision and action may well be grounded on simplifying and biased assumptions and lead to incoherent results-in short, these rules may be heuristical algorithms instead of determinable algorithmsy.' ' Kahneman (2002) argues that such shortcuts are the normal way of making decisions (even among experts) and that calculated rationality occurs only as a deliberate override to such heuristic-or in his terms, intuitive-practices.…”
Section: Article In Pressmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reich (2000), reviewing the work of German social theorist Gerd Gigerenzer, argues that ''yrules for decision and action may well be grounded on simplifying and biased assumptions and lead to incoherent results-in short, these rules may be heuristical algorithms instead of determinable algorithmsy.' ' Kahneman (2002) argues that such shortcuts are the normal way of making decisions (even among experts) and that calculated rationality occurs only as a deliberate override to such heuristic-or in his terms, intuitive-practices.…”
Section: Article In Pressmentioning
confidence: 99%