Hidden Paths from Morality to Cooperation: Moral Judgments Promote Trust and Trustworthiness

The psychology of partner choice

“…Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016) as well as in response to observed, concrete behavior (e.g. people assign either themselves or their partners to an onerous task (Simpson & Harrell, 2013) or donate some amount to charity (Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016). Perhaps the most representative paradigm is when a participant chooses between two (or more) potential partners for an economic interaction, whether that be a trust game (see Table 1 for a description of this and other economic games referenced here) (Bornhorst, Ichino, Kirchkamp, Schlag, & Winter, 2010;Bostyn & Roets, 2017;Everett et al, 2016;Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2016;Pleasant & Barclay, 2018), a prisoner's dilemma (Aksoy, 2015), or a dictator game (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;.…”

“…Some studies have asked participants whether they would like to enter into a trust game with an individual based on some information about that individual (Barclay, 2006;Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013;Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016;Jordan, Hoffman, Nowak, & Rand, 2016;Lammers, Gast, Unkelbach, & Galinsky, 2017;Przepiorka & Liebe, 2016;Simpson & Harrell, 2013). The choice here is not which of two individuals to interact with, but a decision between staying out of the game (and keeping one's endowment) and entering into a game with the potential partner.…”

Faking It Is Hard to Do: Entrepreneurial Norm Enforcement and Suspicions of Deviance

“…At one end of the continuum are situations that mandate actors to express their views on the norm violation. The situations presented in existing experimental studies (see especially Simpson, Harrell, and Willer [2013] and Willer et al [2009]; also, see Jordan et al [2016] for work in evolutionary psychology) tend to induce enforcement via a mandate. In these situations, individuals are specifically asked what they think of others and thus effectively asked whether they are willing to uphold group norms or not.…”

Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness—the punishment of selfishness is not

“…Under these conditions, punishment and (first-order) cooperation will be correlated and thus the former will be a reliable sign of the latter. Although there is empirical evidence in support of a signaling account of peer-punishment (Barclay, 2006;Kurzban et al, 2007;Nelissen et al, 2008;Simpson et al, 2013), there is also evidence opposing or not supporting it (Balafoutas et al, 2014;FeldmanHall et al, 2014;Gordon et al, 2014;Pedersen et al, 2013;Rockenbach and Milinski, 2011). Based on a comprehensive review of this literature, a more elaborate argument recently emerged which tries to pin down the conditions under which we can expect peer-punishment to be a sign of a punisher's cooperative intent (Raihani and Bshary, 2015a).…”

“…Punishing a deviant peer on one's own behalf (second-party punishment) is more likely to be motivated by vengefulness and thus more likely to be perceived as such by an observer (Marlowe et al, 2011;Rockenbach and Milinski, 2011). Punishing a deviant peer on the part of another "victim" (third-party punishment) is more likely to be motivated by the normative desire to establish justice and more likely to be perceived as such by an observer (Simpson et al, 2013;FeldmanHall et al, 2014;Willer et al, 2009). …”